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Parental Separation and
the Child Custody Decision:
Toward a Reconception
DAVID G. DUFF AND ROXANNE MYKITIUK
Contemporary debates regarding the appropriate way to resolve custody and access
disputes reflect deeply rooted conceptions of both the family and the proper
relationship between the family and the state. The prevailing "best interests of the
child" test and judicial presumptions favouring sole custody embody a traditional
definition of the family and a communitarian image of familial relationships.
Conversely, current joint custody legislation adopts a liberal-contractual paradigm,
in which the family is viewed as a joint partnership and children are conceived as
assets to be equally divided upon termination ofthe spousal relationship. The authors
reject both notions of the family and the standards for custody determination
associated with each. Instead, they advance a feminist vision of the family and a
feminist approach to the resolution ofaccess and custody disputes.
Le debat actuel sur les problemes de droits de garde et de visite reflete des
conceptionsfondamentales sur lafamille et sur la relation entre lafamille et l'Etat.
Le test fonde sur"le meilleur interet de l' enfant" quiprevaut encore aujourd' hui et la
tendance des cours de justice apreferer la garde unique reposent sur une definition
traditionnelle de lafamille et sur une image communautaire des relationsfamiliales.
Par contraste, la Legislation actuelle sur la garde conjointe adopte une perspective
liberale et contractuelle, OU la famille est consideree comme une association
conjointe et les enfants comme des biens apartager egalement lors de la rupture du
lien matrimonial. Les auteurs rejettent a la fois la conception de la famille et les
criteres pour la determination du droit de garde proposespar les deux options. A leur
place, elles developpent une vision feministe de lafamille et une approche feministe
au probleme des conflits sur les droits de garde et de visite.
* This paper is an abridged version of a substantially longer work in progress. We are extremely
grateful to Carol Rogerson, Kathleeen Gallivan and Jeremy Paltiel for invaluable comments on
numerous sections of this paper. We are also indebted to the students in Professor Rogerson's
"State, Law and Family" class (Spring 1988) for making the course an especially rewarding
learning experience.
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Introduction
[Cjourts perform two very different functions in the resolution of child custody disputes:
private-dispute-settlement and child protection. The private-dispute-settlement func-
tion is involved when the court must choose between two or more private individuals,
each of whom claims an associational interest with the child. While such a dispute is
ordinarily between adults, it obviously also affects the child .... The second function,
child-protection, involves the judicial enforcement of standards of parental behavior
believed necessary to protect the child. I
When spouses or unmarried partners choose to separate, they invariably experience
the difficult process of disentangling the myriad aspects of their lives that have been
intermingled throughout the period ofcohabitation. Where children are involved, this
task is particularly onerous. First, as King Solomon clearly illustrated? children are
not like chattels or property: they cannot be sold or divided, with equal portions given
to the disputants who are then free to go their separate ways." On the contrary, children
are human beings whose own needs and wishes must be taken into account in any
post-separation custody arrangement. Second, to the extent that both parents desire a
continued relationship with the child, each must of necessity maintain some
association with the other. This result, however, not only contradicts the very
rationale for separation in the first place, but may also be unsatisfactory from the
perspective of the child. At the extreme, continued parental association may pose
substantial risks to the welfare of the child.
Despite these obstacles, all the evidence suggests that more than 90 percent of all
separating families manage to settle their own arrangements for post-separation child
custody without resort to the authoritative ruling ofa court. 4 In these instances, unless
the possibility ofexisting or impending harm to the child comes to the attention of the
child protection authorities or the court," the law is largely content to leave such
matters up to the independent decisions of the families themselves. Where the
families cannot agree, however, any member" may apply to a court "for an order
respecting custody ofor access to the child or determining any aspect of the incidents
of custody of a child."? The law is then faced with the difficult task of sorting out and
1. Robert Mnookin, "Child Custody Adjudication-Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy"
(1975),39 Law and Contemporary Problems 226 at 229.
2. Kings 3:24-28.
3. Provincial legislation adopts this approach to the division of family property at marriage break-
down. See, e.g., Family Law Act, S.O. 1986, c. 4, Part I [hereinafter FLA].
4. Katherine Calton, "Children in the Courts: A Selected Empirical Review" (1978), 1 Can. J. Fam.
L. 329 at 340.
5. See Berend Hovius, Family Law: Cases, Notes andMaterials, (foronto: Carswell, 1987)at 726-38.
6. Provincial legislation stipulates that an application may be initiated by ·'[a] parent of a child or any
other person": Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 68 [as am.], s. 21 [hereinafter
CLRA]. Thus, the Act explicitly contemplates the possibility of an application brought by a child.
7. Ibid. See also ibid. s. 28; and Divorce Act, 1985, S.C. 1986, c. 4, ss. 16(4),(6) [hereinafter DA
(1985)].
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assigning the "bundle of parental rights and obligations" that, while typically divided
during the period ofcohabitation, remained undifferentiated in the eyes of the law. At
the same time, it must take care that neither the outcome nor the process of this
determination causes significant injury to the welfare of the child. The first task is that
of private or intra-familial dispute-settlement; the second constitutes child protection.
The distinction between these two forms of legal intervention is crucial to
understanding the law of child custody. 8 Since the specific outcome in any given
custody dispute is shaped fundamentally by the decision maker's conception of the
task before it, the comparative importance which a given legal system attaches to the·
goals of private dispute-settlement and child protection governs the character of
custody decisions within that jurisdiction. More generally, the relative weight given
to each role in the context of custody disputes has profound implications for the
manner in which a society defmes the position of children within the family, and the
relationship between the family and the state." Where the custody decision is
conceived primarily from the perspective of intra-familial dispute-settlement, the law
emphasizes family autonomy by looking to the norms and patterns of familial
relationships themselves to determine the outcomes of specific custody disputes.
Where custody law is primarily informed by notions of child protection, on the other
hand, the resolution of the custody decision is based upon societal norms concerning
appropriate family structures and methods of child rearing.
This paper explores the' character of the custody decision and advances an
alternative approach to that adopted both in contemporary custody law concerning
disputes between divorced or separated parents, and in current proposals for the
substantive reform of these principles. First, we consider the institution of the family
and the role of law in family conflict. 10 In contrast to traditional communitarian and
liberal conceptions, we develop a feminist approach to understanding both the family
and the legal resolution of intra-familial disputes. Second, we review the basic
structure of contemporary custody law to determine the extent to which it emphasizes
the functions of dispute-settlement or child protection. 11 Noticing a clear priority of
child protection principles over those ofprivate dispute-settlement, we trace the legal
emphasis on this latter function to traditional communitarian conceptionsof the family
as a "natural" sphere of human interaction to which legal regulation is antithetical.
Third, we survey the broad contours of Canadian custody determinations to critique
the manner in which this child protection rationale manifests itself in the context of
8. For a contrary opinion, claiming that this distinction recalls "the stultifying common-law fOnDS of
action," and obscures the common problem of "how and to what extent the law can, through the
manipulation of a child's external environment, protect his physical and emotional development,"
see Joseph Goldstein, Albert Solnit and Anna Freud, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child,
(New York: Macmillan, 1973) at 5.
9. Mnookin, supra, note 1 at 265.
10. Infra, notes 16-128 and accompanying text.
11. Infra, notes 129-166 and accompanying text.
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specific custody disputes.F Fourth, we examine the two leading proposals for
substantive custody reform: a judicial presumption favouring sole custody to the
child's primary caregiver.P and a legislative presumption of joint custody to both
parents following separation or divorce.!" While each reform promises distinct
improvements upon the current custody regime, neither fully escapes the insidious
logic of the child protection principle, and neither realizes the contextual and
relational approach to intra-familial dispute-settlement that we endorse as a model for
the resolution of custody disputes. Finally, while this contextual model makes it
impossible to formulate a priori outcomes to actual custody disputes, we offer some
suggestions for the implementation of an adjudicative approach along the lines that
we develop. 15
Law and the Family
The dominant tendencies in contemporary family literature and legal discourse are to
treat the family as either a "natural" and homogeneous form of social organization16
or, more recently, as a contractual unit created and dissolved by the independent will
of its founding members, 17 and to conceive of autonomy as opposition and isolation.18
As a result, "family autonomy" is conventionally understood either as the separation
of the sphere of "natural" familial interaction from the rest of society (and, above all,
as the exclusion of these "private" family relationships from regulation by law), 19 or
(consistent with contractarian principles of individual rights, voluntariness and
self-sufficiency) as the liberty of family members to determine the form and content of
their own relationships free from public regulation.P This section examines each
notion offamily privacy,21 challenges the presuppositions on which they are based.P
12. Infra, notes 167-289 and accompanying text.
13. Infra, notes 298-365 and accompanying text. While this presumption is generally referred to as
that of the "primary caretaker" we prefer to follow Susan Boyd in defining the role as one of
caregiving since this term describes the nature of the relationship far more accurately: Susan Boyd,
"Child Custody, Women's Work and Ideology" Paper Presented at The Clara Brett Martin Work-
shop, University of Toronto Faculty of Law (October 21, 1988) at 3. The expression was
originally suggested to us by Kathleen Gallivan.
14. Infra, notes 366-414 and accompanying text.
15. Infra, notes 361-365, 412-414 and accompanying text.
16. See Margrit Eichler, Families in Canada Today: Recent Changes and Their Policy Consequences,
(Toronto: Gage, 1983) at 1-61.
17. Within this paradigm, therefore, children are typically conceived not as independent contractual
interlocutors, but instead as the property of the autonomous adult actors.
18. See Jennifer Nedelsky, "Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities" (1989),
Yale J. Law & Feminism (forthcoming).
19. Katherine O'Donovan, Sexual Divisions in the Law, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985)at
2-11.
20. For a critical commentary on this approach to domestic agreements, see David G. Duff, "The
Supreme Court and the New Family Law: Working Through the Pelech Trilogy" (1988),
46 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 542 at 551-67.
21. Infra, notes 24-54 and accompanying text.
22. Infra notes 55-116 and accompanying text.
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and develops an alternative conception of legal dispute resolution consistent with the
more contextual and relational understanding of the family that we prefer.P
FAMILY PRIVACY
Conventional notions of family autonomy onginate in classical liberalism and
traditional approaches to anthropology and sociology. The former interprets
autonomy as separateness, and views the delineation of fixed boundaries between
individuals, and especially between individuals and the state, as a necessary
condition of political freedom. 24 The latter defmes The Family itselfas a specific form
of individual: a single, organic unit, biologically determined and indivisible. In
combination, they establish two distinct but related justifIcations for the preservation
and encouragement of family privacy: a socio-biological rationale, based on the
presumed functional imperatives of sound family life; and a political rationale,
premised on the supposed relationship between family privacy and individual liberty .
The Natural Family
Traditional anthropology conceives of The Family as a natural organism with social
roles biologically dictated by their functional relationship to the larger whole.
Beginning with Bronislaw Malinkowski's work on the aboriginal peoples of
Australia.P anthropologists have conventionally defined this "universal function" as
the nurturing of children. On this basis, they have typically identified three features
as intrinsic to the very notion ofThe Family by virtue of their functional relationship
to the task of child rearing.j" First, families have to have "clear boundaries":
... for if families [are] to perform the vital function of nurturing children, insiders
[have] to be distinguishable from outsiders so that everyone [can] know which adults
[are] responsible for the care of which children.V
Second, families must have "a place where family members [can] be together and
where the daily tasks associated with child rearing [can] be performed. ,,28 In other
words, families require "a defmite physical space, a hearth and home. "29 Finally,
families are characterized by "a particular set of emotions, family love.,,3o As
23. Infra, notes 117-28 and accompanying text.
24: See, e.g., David Sugarman, "The Legal Boundaries of Liberty: Dicey, Liberalismand Legal
Science" (1982), 46 Mod. L. Rev. 102.
25. Bronislaw Malinkowski, The Family Among The Australian Aborigines, (London:Universityof
London Press, 1913).
26. See Jane Collier, Michelle Z. Rosaldo and SylviaYanagisako, "Is There a Family?New Anthropo-
logical Views," in Barrie Thorne, ed., Rethinking the Family: Some Feminist Questions, (New
York: Longman, 1982) 25 at 25-28.
27. Ibid. at 26.
28. Ibid. at 26-27.
29. Ibid. at 27.
30. Ibid.
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Malinkowski and theorists since him have argued, the "long and intimate association
among family members," necessitated by the task of child rearing, fosters "close
emotional ties, particularly between parents and children, but also between spouses.v'"
Indeed, for Sigmund Freud and those following him, this family intimacy represents
the sinequanonof healthy emotional development in children.V According to Joseph
Goldstein, for example:
Such constantly ongoing interactions between parents and children become for each
child the starting point of an all-important line of development that leads to adult
functioning. Helplessness requires total care and over time is transformed into the need
or wish for approval and love. It fosters the desire to please by compliance with the
parent's wishes. Itprovides a developmental base upon which the child's responsiveness
to educational efforts rests. Love for parents leads to identification with them, without
which impulse control and socialization would be deficient. 33
For German sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies, writing at the end of the nineteenth
century.P" this portrayal-of family life was neatly summarized in the theory of
Gemeinschaft or community." In this organic world of "intimate, private, and
exclusive living together,,,36 relationships are "mediated by love, duty and a common
understanding and purpose," and justice is conceived as the altruistic suppression of
individual interests so as to avoid conflict and preserve social harmony. 37 Indeed,
Tonnies explains that
the theory of Gemeinschaft starts from the assumption of perfect unity of human wills as
an original or natural condition which is preserved in spite of actual separation.38
In opposition to this private sphere, Tonnies theorized, is the "mechanical" and
"artificial" world of "public life" or Gesellschaft (societyj." Conceived as "mere
coexistence ofpeople independent of each other,"40 this public domain ofpolitics and
commerce is constituted by interaction among equal atomistic individuals, each
31. Ibid.
32. See, e.g., Sigmund Freud,Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, (1926), Standard Edition, vol.20
(1959). For twomorecurrent Freudian interpretations, seeGoldstein, Solnit andFreud, supra,
note8; andChristopher Lasch,Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged, (New York:
BasicBooks,1977).
33. Joseph Goldstein, "In Whose Bestinterests?" in Jay Folberg, ed., Joint Custody and Shared
Parenting, (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1984) 47 at 50.
34. Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Society (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft), Charles P. Loomis
Trans. (EastLansing: Michigan StateUniversity Press, 1957), (originally published 1887).
35. Ibid. at 37-64.
36. Ibid. at 33.
37. O'Donovan, supra, note 19 at 4.
38. Tonnies, supra, note34 at 37.
39. Ibid. at 33, 35. See alsothesection on theTheory of Gesellschaft: ibid. at 64-102.
40. Ibid. at 34.
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pursuing his (typically) own self-interest."! Here, justice emphasizes "formality,
neutrality of adjudication, precision, rationality and predictability," and individuals
are viewed as "abstract right and duty-bearing entities.,,42 Thus, while "public';
interaction is governed by the Rule of Law, the constitution of this communitarian
version of the "private" family is the pre-contractual State of Nature. 43
On this analysis, it follows, to subject intra-familial relationships to legal
regulation would be to undermine precisely those values that define The Family as
such. As one commentator has recently argued:
[T]he very appeal to law '" is atomistic in that it circumvents the ... standards of family
decision: private persuasion and eventual accommodation based on solicitude for the
person with whom one disagrees. 44
For others, legal "intervention" in family life would contradict the most essential
requirements of proper child development, thereby endangering the very future of
humanity.P In Goldstein's opinion, for example:
These complex and vital developments require the privacy of family life under
guardianship by parents who are autonomous. When family integrity is broken or
weakened by state intrusion, the child's needs are thwarted and the belief that parents are
omniscient and all-powerful is shaken prematurely. The effect on the child's
developmental progress is invariably detrimental. The child's need for safety within the
confines ofthe family must be met by law through its recognition offamily privacy as the
barrier to state intrusion upon parental autonomy in child rearing. These rights - parental
autonomy, a child's entitlement to autonomous parents, and privacy - are essential
ingredients of "family integrity. ,,46
Thus, it is argued, The Family must be isolated from regulation by law.
Superimposed upon these socio-biological justifications for the natural conception
41. Thereis, however,in liberaltheory, a failureto recognize thatwhatgoeson in privatehasa bearing
on the ability to participate as an equalpersonin the public realm. The autonomous actor in the
public sphere cannotsubsist inside this publicrealm alone. He (andthat is usuallywhathe is) can
onlyenterthepublic fromthesecurity andcomfort provided by his intimate "private" surroundings.
42. O'Donovan, supra, note 19 at 5. Also, following the liberalpublic-private dichotomy the two
spheresshape differenttypes of discourse and justice. The one rational and abstract, the other
intimate,contextual andconcrete.To the extentthatwomens'roleswereconcentrated in thehome,
inside the private realm where the secondtype of discourse prevailed, they were, by implica-
tion, disqualified fromthe discourseof thepublicrealm. Engaged in the contextof thefamily their
interestsand standpoint were disparaged as parochial and partialand therefore, unfitfor the
generalized abstractions whichdominate thepublic.
43. FrancesE. Olsen,"The Mythof StateIntervention in theFamily"(1985).18 J. LawReform835 at
844.
44. CarlE. Schneider,"MoralDiscourseand theTransformation of American FamilyLaw"(1985),83
Mich. L. Rev. 1801 at 1858.
45. See, e.g., Goldstein, SoInitand Freud, supra, note 8 at Ill.
46. Goldstein, supra, note 33 at 50.
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of family privacy is a further rationale supplied by classical liberalism. To the extent
that the family is viewed as a single person (whether this is the male head of the
nineteenth century or the "perfect unity of human wills" envisioned by traditional
communitarianism), legal regulation of family life is inconceivable because of the
inviolability of the individual."? Indeed, for the state to intrude upon this "natural"
individual would be to violate the most basic principles of individual liberty,
subjecting "private" family life to "an external set of standards," enforced against
individual family members by the coercive apparatus of the state." Consequently, as
the English Court of Appeal declared in 1919, "each house is [and, by implication,
must remain] a domain into which the King's writ does not seek to run and to which
his officers do not seek to be admitted.t'"? More recently, a commentary on Ontario's
new Child and Family Services Act describes the family as "the basic unit of society,"
with the right "to grow and develop within its own sphere without outside interference
and intervention. ,,50
The Contractual Family
While the natural family invokes organic conceptions of human society, the
contractual family is thoroughly liberal. Rather than viewing the family as a natural
entity with which neither the state nor law should interfere for fear they would disrupt
its internal harmony, liberal theory envisions family relations in precisely the same
contractual framework as the traditional atomistic conception of the public domain or
Gesellschaft.P! Thus, family members are conceived as radically separate individuals,
and free will is posited as the means by which the family is both brought into existence
and terminated. Accordingly, although the family becomes a legitimate domain for
legal regulation, such intervention is welcome only to the extent that it is compatible
with the abstract will of each contracting party.
While this model can at least roughly account for the relationship between each
parent,52 it clearly poses considerable difficulties in accounting for the position of
children. Some have attempted to address this problem by positing fictional contracts
with Rawlsian child-persons.P More generally, however, children are largely invisible
within the contractual family. As a result, although some contemporary discourse
equates the liberalization of the family with both the juridical equality of men with
47. See, e.g., John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, David Spitz Ed. (New York: Norton, 1975)at 70-86: "Of
the Limits to the Authority of Society over the Individual".
48. Schneider, supra, note 44 at 1858.
49. Balfour v. Balfour [1919],2 K.B. 571 at 579 (C.A.), per Atkin LJ.
50. Douglas W. Phillips, "The Child and Family Services Act: The Mechanics and Roles of Court,
Lawyer and Professional" (1985), 45 R.F.L. 229 at 301.
51. See. e.g., Margorie Maguire Shultz, "Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State
Policy" (1982), 70 Calif. L. Rev. 204.
52. On the other hand, as explained helow, there are serious deficiencies in such a separative concep-
tion of relationships even among adults. Infra, notes 85-128 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., David L. Chambers, "Rethinking the SubstantiveRules for Custody Disputes in Divorce"
(1984), 83 Mich. L. Rev. 477 at 497-98. See also Sheila Schwartz, "Toward a Presumption of
Joint Custody" (1984), 18 Faro. L. Q. 225 at 245.
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women and of parents with children,54 liberal notions of the family suffer from an
unfortunate tendency to conceive of children more as the property of their parents.
than as persons in their own right.
STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY
Implicit in the first notion of family privacy arising from the "natural family" are three
assumptions regarding the nature of law and the relationship between the family and
the state: first, that the family exists naturally, without reference to law and the state;
second, that legal intervention encourages social conflict and undermines the values
of community upon which the family depends; and third, that state action necessarily
contradicts the idea of autonomy. None of these suppositions can sustain critical
analysis.
Private and Public
To begin with, it is impossible to conceptualize the family in isolation from law and
the state. 55 On the contrary, in carving out a domain of human interaction "free" from
legal intervention, society necessarily articulates a particular set of norms respecting
both the forms of human relationships recognized as families and the substance of
those relationships themselves.
While traditional anthropological theory depicts these relationships as biologically
determined and therefore purely "natural," critical analysis reveals conventional
notions of the family to be projections of highly culturally relative patterns of family
life. Specifically, Malinkowski' s view of the family as a functionally integrated
social formation devoted to the nurturance ofchildren corresponds to one ofthe major
roles that families have served in modem industrial societies.P'' So too, Tonnies'
GemeinshaftJGeseIlschaft dichotomy corresponds to a particular form of social life,
characteristic of nineteenth and twentieth century Western culture, in which the
intimate realm of the "private" family is defined in opposition to the impersonal
"public" domain of the state and the market.
In neither case, therefore, can these depictions be viewed as "natural." On the
contrary, the contemporary institution of the family, to which these portrayals
correspond, is of remarkably recent origin in the history of human societies, dating
only from the emergence of the market and the nation state in Western Europe in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.57 Equally, the concept of "childhood" is, to a
54. See, e.g., David A.J. Richards, "The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution: A Jurispruden-
tial Perspective" (1980),55 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1.
55. Frances E. Olsen, ''The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform" (1983), 93
Harv. L. Rev. 1497; Olsen, "Myth of State Intervention," supra, note 43; Martha Minow,
"Beyond State Intervention: For Baby Jane Doe" (1985), 18 J. Law Reform 933.
56. Collier, Rosaldo and Yanagisako, supra, note 26 at 27.
57. Olsen, "Family and Market," supra, note 55. See also Mary AnnGlendon, The New Family and
(he New Property, (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981).
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considerable extent, socially constructed. 58 Thus, for example, "adolescence" is
largely the creation of modem industrial societies.P? in which the family has declined
as the major unit of economic production, and a prolonged period of education has
replaced early childhood participation in the productive life of the family. 60
If, therefore, it is impossible to identify the family as a purely natural institution,
the "private" family can exist only as a socially defined sphere of human interaction.
And, thus, as Fran Olsen has so persuasively reasoned.?' since law and the state
necessarily define both the form and the boundaries of those relationships that qualify
as families, "state intervention" in the "private" family is unavoidable. Instead, the
very concept of The Family assumes a particular structure of human relationships,
implicitly sanctioned by the state both by its "nonintervention" and by its
"intervention."
Thus, for example, despite the documented diversity of actual family structures
both throughout human history, 62 and in contemporary society,63 the conventional
notion of the family remains distinctly heterosexual, procreative, nuclear and
co-residential. According to Margrit Eichler, "the most famous and most widely used
definition of the family" refers to it as
.. , a social group characterized by common residence, economic cooperation, and
reproduction [including] adults of both sexes [maintaining] a socially approved sexual
relationship, and one or more children, own or adopted, of the sexually cohabitating
adults.f"
Notwithstanding human rights guarantees against discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation.P" the law does not recognize homosexual marriages.P'' and homo-
sexual relationships are excluded from the operation of provincial family law legisla-
58. See, e.g., Arlene Skolnick, "The Limits of Childhood: Conceptions of Child Development and
Social Context" (1975), 39 Law and Contemporary Problems 38; Michael P. Roche, "Child-
hood and its Implications for Children's Rights" (1988), 34 Loyola L. Rev. 5. The modem classic
remains Philippe Aries, Centuries a/Childhood: A Social History ofFamily Life, Robert
Baldick Trans. (New York: Vintage, 1962).
59. This is not to say that the adolescence was inexorably determined by the structure of industrial
society. Clearly, the forced removal of children from the labour market by child labour laws
and compulsory school attendance played a central role. See, e.g., Skolnick, ibid. at 63.
60. Ibid. at 61-63. See also F. Raymond Marks, "Detours on the Road to Maturity: A View of the
Legal Conception of Growing Up and Letting Go" (1975), 39 Law and Contemporary Problems
78.
61. Olsen, "Myth of State Intervention," supra, note 43 at 844.
62. Collier, Rosaldo and Yanagisako, supra, note 26.
63. Eichler, supra, note 16 at 1-61.
64. Ibid. at 2.
65. See, e.g., Human Rights Code. 1981, S.O. 1981, c. 53, s. 1 [as am. S.O. 1986, c. 64, s. 18].
66. See, e.g., M.J. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. A.D., 1976); Adams and Sullivan v. Hower-
ton, 486 Fed. Supp. 1119 (U.S. Dist. Ct., 1980).
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tion. 67 Statutory provisions governing child adoption convey the legal fiction that the
child was actually born to the adopting parent. 68 Only recently were Ontario munici-.
palities prohibited from enacting by-laws limiting the number of unrelated people
living together within the same home. 69 Finally, and of particular relevance to the law
of child custody, is the inescapable implication of this definition that a family no
longer exists where the parents have separated.70
As well as determining the forms of human interaction recognized as families, the
state inescapably shapes the character of relationships within the family. Thus, for
example, where child abuse and spousal assault have been treated as "private" family
matters, and thereby shielded from legal intervention, the state has tacitly condoned
hierarchical relationships of patriarchal and parental authority within the family."!
Likewise, legal intervention in the name of preserving family privacy itself
presupposes a particular conception of the appropriate roles within the family. Thus,
for the common law of the nineteenth century, family privacy supported patriarchal
norms.F Women were prohibited from holding property and from entering into
contracts.P and children were presumed to be the servants of their father alone. 74
As Olsen recounts:
If the wife were to leave and take the children with her, the courts would ordinarily be
expected to grant a habeas corpus writ ordering her to return them to him. For courts to
refuse to issue such a writ would be considered state intervention in the family.75
While contemporary contractual notions of the private family generally assume the
juridical equality of men and women, they still authorize considerable parental
authority over children.I" Consequently, it is not at all uncommon to see the
67. See, e.g., Anderson v. Luoma (1984)", 42 R.F.L. (2d) 444 at 448 (B.C.S.C.): "The Family
Relations Act does not purport to affect the legal responsibilities which homosexuals may have
to each other or to children born to one of them as a result of artificial insemination."
68. Child and Family Services Act, S.D. 1984, c. 55, s. 152 [hereinafter CFSA].
69. See, e.g., Mary Gooderham, "Municipal critic assails proposal that would limit family size,"
Globe & Mail (14 February 1989) A4.
70. See infra, note 158 and accompanying text.
71. Olsen, "Myth of State Intervention," supra, note 43 at 853-54. For an especially lucid analysis of
the changing legal response to spousal assault in Canada, see Timothy A.D. Endicott, "The
Criminality of Wife Assault" (1987), 46 V.T. Fac. L. Rev. 355. The evolving legal reaction to
child abuse is brilliantly documented in M.D.A. Freeman, The Rights and Wrongs ofChildren,
(Dover, N.H.: F. Pinter, 1983).
72. Olsen, "Myth of Stale Intervention," supra, note 43 at 849-53. See, e.g., Tonnies, supra, note 34
at 39, asserting that "the idea of authority is, within the Gemeinschaft, most adequately repre-
sented by fatherhood, or paternity."
73. Susan Maidment, Child Custody and Divorce: The Law in Social Context, (London: Croom Helm,
1984) at 4.
74. See, e.g., King v. DeManneville, 102 Eng. Rep. 1054 (K.B. 1804); Ex parte Skinner (1824),9
Moore 278; Re Agar-Ellis, (1883) 24 Ch. D. 317; State v . Richardson, 40 N.H. 272 (1860).
See also H.H. foster and n.r. Freed, "Life with Father" (1978) 11 Fam. L.Q. 321.
75. Olsen, "Myth of Stale Intervention," supra, note 43 at 850.
76. Ibid. See also Skolnick, supra, note 58; and Roche, supra, note 58.
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expressions "family autonomy" and "parental autonomy" employed interchangeably.77
While this slight of hand obscures the implicit moralchoices involved in deciding
when the state should "intervene" and when it should "respect family privacy," it
cannot eliminate the necessity of making that choice. In Yoder v . Wisconsin,78 for
example, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court found it unnecessary to inquire into
the wishes of the children in ruling that the religious freedom of their Amish parents
prohibited the state from requiring compulsory education of the children after the
eighth grade. In a number of more recent cases,"? on the other hand, the same Court
has interpreted the constitutional right to privacy to safeguard minors' access to
contraceptives and abortion services, notwithstanding parental opposition. While the
identification of family autonomy with parental authority defmes the latter decisions
as "state intrusion" and the former as "nonintervention," it is equally apparent that
Yoder entails state intervention infavour ofparental authority.
Finally, the state is deeply implicated in the form of contemporary family
relationships by virtue of the background rules and policies that shape the relative
capacities of each family member for truly autonomous action. 80 Government
decisions concerning the tax consequences of unpaid domestic labour, the prevention
of workplace discrimination, and the regulation of reproduction and child care are
central to the position that women occupy within the family. Similarly, government
policies regarding the status of children are equally constitutive of their capacity for
autonomous action with respect to the family. As Olsen explains:
A child's economic dependence on her [or his] parents reinforces and increases the
parent's power over the child. Although young children might not be capable of
independence, as children grow older their dependence is increasingly attributable to
stateregulations. 81
Thus, for example, while labour legislation restricting the hours and categories of
child employment is of obvious benefit to children, such regulations nevertheless
make it difficult for children to achieve economic independence.V Furthermore, as
Olsen observes: "State laws not only limit a child's opportunity for paid employment,
they also require the child to attend school- work for which she [or he] receives no
pay. "83 Finally,
77. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra, note 33 at 5.
78. 406 U.S. 205 (1972), (Justice Douglas dissenting) [hereinafter Yoder].
79. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976);
Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S.
398 (1981); Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983). See also Gillick v.
West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority, [1985] 3 All E.R. 402 (H.L.).
80. Olsen, "Myth of State Intervention," supra, note 43 at 848.
81. Ibid. at 851-52.
82. Ibid. at 852.
83. Ibid.
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... when a state pays welfare benefits for a child or orders one parent to pay support for a
child, the money does not go to the child herself [or himself], but to a custodian, usually
the other parent. This maintains the child's economic dependency on her [or his]
custodian.t"
Indeed, student assistance programs that refuse fmancial support to applicants whose
parents earn more than a stated amount prolong this condition of dependency well
beyond teenhood.
In each of these respects, therefore, by defining those social formations recognized
as families, by determining when and when not to "intervene," and by establishing
the background rules and policies by which relative power within the family is
shaped, the state cannot help but "intervene" in the "private" family domain. In fact,
the dichotomies of intervention/nonintervention and private/public are themselves
incoherent. As a society, we collectively cannot escape the necessity of making
choices.
Law and Community
Choices, of course, are implicit in both communitarian and Iiberal-contractarian
conceptions of family privacy. In the first, the natural family is viewed as a refuge of
altruism, love and community, in a society of self-interest, alienation and isolation: a
"haven in a heartless world. "85 Who would wish upon this vision ofthe private family
the Rule of Law that divides and separates atomistic individuals in the social world?
The image ofthe natural family has a (justifiably) powerful appeal in contemporary
society and requires sensitive treatment by those who wish to challenge the
dichotomy upon which it is based. 86 It is not enough simply to "demystify" the private
family by exposing the manner in which it is itself a product of society. Nor is it
sufficient to point to the all-too-frequent instances in which spousal and child abuse
and, more generally, male domination of women and parental oppression of children
call the idealized vision of the affectionate family into question. By those whose
experience does not mirror these patterns, or for whom current structures are not felt
as oppressive.F these accounts are all too readily dismissed as pathological.V For
84. Ibid.
85. Lasch, supra, note 32.
86. We bracket the word "justifiably" to indicate that, while we support many of the animating values
that inform the traditional image, we question their incarnation within this traditional form.
87. It is important that we not succumb to notions of "false consciousness" to characterize those whose
conception of social reality does not accord with our own. My conception of your oppression is
not in fact your oppression unless you feel it as your oppression. Following Nedelsky, we use the
word "feel" here rather than "perceived" to indicate that people may be wrong in their percep-
tions, but not in their feelings. See Nedelsky, supra, note 18 at 17-20. While I may offer you my
(mere) perception that you may be oppressed, that you might re-examine your perceptions to
discover your true feelings, I cannot discount your feelings. When I do, I become your oppressor.
88. Perceiving much male privilege as "natural" and/or failing to even appreciate the existence of more
subtle forms of male power (we are thinking of studies in which men feel that a woman has
"dominated" a conversation where she speaks more than a third of the time), it is especially easy for
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many in our society, albeit undoubtedly for more men than women, and for more
adults than children, family life can indeed represent a sanctuary - from the
workplace.P? from school, from government agencies, from traffic and public
transportation, from shopping malls and supermarkets. The private/public dichotomy
which sustains an image of the natural family may be incoherent, but it is not an
illusion.
To challenge traditional communitarian notions of the private family we must also
develop an alternative vision of law. In particular, we need to reconceive legal rights
and law in a manner that is both reflective and constitutive rather than destructive of
community. In this project, moreover, lies the possibility of developing "richer
notions ofrights"?" by which we may redefme not only familial relationships, but also
relationships in the "public" spheres of the marketplace and the state."! So too, we
require a different conception ofautonomy: one which, while respecting the values of
freedom and self-determination is mindful of the socially constituted and relational
nature of the self.
This task has been effectively begun by Martha Minow. 92 In contrast to
conventional rights theories, she adopts as the starting point for thinking about rights
concrete relationships among social beings, rather than entitlements of abstract
individuals in a state of assumed isolation.P As Minow explains:
According to this view, legal rights are interdependent and mutually defining. They
arise in the context of relationships among people who are themselves interdependent
and mutually defining. In this sense, every right and every freedom is no more than a
claim limited by the possible claims of others. Rights, in fact, could be understood as
simply the articulation of legal consequences for particular patterns of human and
institutional relationships. 94
men to dismiss extreme forms of physical abuse in this fashion. Yet, for many women too,
nurtured on a culture of caring and often attracted by ideas of family and motherhood, the affection-
ate family is a compelling vision. Even among children, the most powerless in the contempo-
rary family, family life is by no means invariably experienced as oppressive.
89. Recognizing, of course, that for most women the home is also the workplace - even when they also
work outside the home.
90. Martha Minow, "Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights"
(1986), 9 Harv. Women's L.J. I at 15.
91. For an especially stimulating application of this thinking to an analysis of the contemporary bureau-
cratic state, see Nedelsky, supra, note 18.
92. Martha Minow, "'Forming Underneath Everything That Grows:' Toward a History of Family
Law," [1985] Wise. L. Rev. 819; Minow, "Rights for the Next Generation," supra, note 91;
Martha Minow, "Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover" (1987), 96 Yale L.J. 1860.
93 This, of course, has been the approach of modem liberal theory, beginning with Thomas Hobbes
and John Locke. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: Collier, 1962); John Locke, Two
Treatises ofGovernment, Everyman's library edn. (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1975). The modem
classic is undoubtedly John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1971). For a more recent account, see Ernest J. Weinrib, "Law as a Kantian Idea of
Reason" (1987), 87 Colum. L. Rev. 472.
94. Minow, "Interpreting Rights," supra, note 92 at 1884.
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Of particular importance to an analysis of custody law, this relational approach
admits the possibility of specifying children's rights - a notion that is inadequately
accommodated by liberal rights theories in which abstract rights inhere only in fully
"responsible" and "autonomous" adults. Since every assertion of individual rights
"expresses relationships and interconnections at the very moment that the individual
asserts his or her autonomy ... children's rights are no more problematic than adult's
rights because all rights claims imply relationships among members of a com-
munity. ,,95
Furthermore, since legal rights are themselves both constituted by and constitutive
of community, the regulation of familial relationships through this reconceived "rule
of law" need not contradict the animating values of community which inspire
conventional notions of the natural family. While traditional rights theories establish
barriers between alienated individuals, assertions of relationally conceived rights
translate, but do not initiate conflict" Citing Goss v. Lopezi" for example, where a
majority of the u.s. Supreme Court held that the constitutional entitlement to due
process includes the right of secondary school students to an informal hearing before
expulsion, Minow observes that "conflict was present long before anyone asserted in
court that students had rights."98 In fact, the appeal to law served not as a stimulus to
conflict but as a means of resolving a dispute already in existence.
Finally, instead of undermining social cohesion, the appeal to rights discourse can
actually "reconfirm" community.99 Substantively, although every concrete rights
claim is inevitably highly contextual, the very concept of a right implies the ability to
universalize its meaning within the community as a whole. In this respect, the
declaration of one's own rights implies a recognition of the equal rights of others. 100
Similarly, on a procedural level, resort to the language of rights implies participation
in the process through which the collective choices of the community shape our
individual existence within society at the same time that our individual existence
helps shape the community.
95. Ibid. at 1888.
96. Ibid. at 1871.
97. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
98. Minow, "Interpreting Rights," supra, note 92 at 1872.
99. Ibid. at 1873.
100. Recognizing the value of equality is among the most crowning theoretical acbievements of liberal
rights theories and, we believe, must not be abandoned in a shift toward a more relational
notion of rights. However, a relational/contextual approach can provide a richer conception of
equality than the liberal, similarly situated test. Similarlysituated assumes a stance of homoge-
neity, typically where one point of view is posited as the norm against which all else is measured
and labelled different. On this view all that is the same is equal and all that is different is less
than the norm (which is usually the male standard). Here, difference is dichotomized rather than
treated as a continuum where the plurality and diversity of differences are attended to. A
relational approach to equality recognizes diversity and interconnections and constructs a heteroge-
neous view of equality. For a sophisticated elaboration of this view of equality and difference
see, e.g., Zillah R. Eisenstein, The Female Body and the Law, (Berkeley: University of California




On the other hand, as classical liberalism has rightly emphasized, there is a danger
in any theory that takes social relations as the starting point for thinking about rights.
While conventional notions of the Rule of Law have undermined values of
community, traditional communitarianism has been equally indifferent to values of
individualityand autonomy.101 Tonnies' theory of Gemeinschaft, for example, abjures
all notions of individuality by viewing the community as a "perfect unity of human
wills."
Minow herself, while clearly recognizing the possibility of conflict between the
individual and the community, appears similarly unable to resolve this tension in a
manner that guarantees respect for individual autonomy. Conceiving of rights claims
as demands on the community for "equality of attention," she suggests that the
claimant "acknowledges ... membership in the larger group, her participation in its
traditions, and her observation of its forms" and implicitly agrees "to abide by the
community's response."102 As a result, the community remains the final arbiter of the
claimant's right, without any basis (other than "equality of attention") for grounding
its response.
The potential coercion of the individual by the collective has been a powerful
rationale for the liberal enterprise ofdrawing fixed boundaries between the individual
and the state. In the context of the family, this fear underlies arguments for family
privacy on the grounds that legal regulation would subject the family to "an external
set of standards enforced by might."103 So too does it inform contractarianconceptions
of the family as a specific social organization based upon the freely-willed consent of
perfectly equal and rational rights-bearing selves. Who would impose upon this
notion of the private family state-imposed norms and forms of relationship dictated
by the larger collectivity?
As with communitarian notions of the natural family, the values of individual
liberty and self-determination informing liberal-contractarian conceptions of the
family also have a (justifiably) powerful appeal in contemporary society'?' and
require sensitive treatment by those who would challenge the individualistic rights
framework within which they are traditionally understood. Here too - as with the
communitarian belief that legal regulation would destroy the intimate character of
family life - it is not enough merely to assert the conceptual impossibility of "non-
intervention" in the "private" sphere of the family. Nor is it sufficient to expose the
many ways in which the private/public dichotomy masks the manner in which societal
choices both define the forms of human relationships recognized as families and
shape the substance of those relationships. In addition, as Jennifer Nedelsky has so
101. See, e.g., Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981);
Michael Sandel, "Justice and the Good," in Sandel, ed., Liberalism and its Critics, (New York:
New York University Press, 1984).
102. Minow, "Interpreting Rights," supra, note 92 at 1874, 1879.
103. Schneider, supra, note 44 at 1858.
104. On the bracketed use of the word "justifiably," see supra, note 86.
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keenly recognized, we must also develop an alternative conception of autonomy. 105
This begins with the recognition that "a real and enduring tension between the .
individual and the collective" is inherent in the human condition.V" In contrast to
classical liberalism, however, which only acknowledges this tension in order to
assume it away (by the abstraction of a social contract through which isolated
individuals enter into a "society" that neverreally exists as such), such a reconception
recognizes explicitly that
(w]e come into being in a social context that is literally constitutive of us. Some of our
most essential characteristics, such as our capacity for language and the conceptual
framework through which we see the world, are not made by us, but are given to us (or
developed in us) through our interactions with others. 107
As a result, Nedelsky explains: "The collective is not simply a potential threat to
individuals, but constitutive of them, and thus is a source of their autonomy as well as
a danger to it.,,108 The problem in any given circumstance, of course, ishow to combine
this appreciation of "the constitutiveness of social relations" with the enduring values
of liberty and self-determination that we have inherited from liberal theory. 109
Feminism offers invaluable insights for developing alternative notions of autonomy.
Women's lived experience of definition not by and for themselves, but through their
relations with others (as someone's wife or mother), makes feminists acutely aware of
"the centrality of relationships in constituting the self. "JlG On the other hand, for
women, this experience has traditionally been one of abnegation rather than
realization of self through others. Consequently, as Nede1sky explains:
In developing such concepts, feminists have an advantage in avoiding one of the pitfalls
of challenges to liberal individualism: women's experience of relationships as
oppressive as well as essential has the virtue of making us less likely to be romantic about
the virtues of community as such. 111
Of particular importance to the manner in which we interpret the relationship between
the family and the state are two features of the concept of autonomy developed by
Nedelsky. First, she maintains, while autonomy is a capacity, it is a capacity that is
intimately related to "the feeling or experience of being autonomous. ,,112 Crucially,
this approach "defines as authoritative the voices of those whose autonomy is at
issue."113 Second, autonomy is not an abstract faculty that one may simply assume
105. Nedelsky, supra, note 18 at 1.
106. Ibid. at 15.




111. Ibid. at 4, n. 9.
112. Ibid. at 18.
113. Ibid. at 19.
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about human beings - or at least about all persons beyond an arbitrary "age of
majority." On the contrary, persons develop and sustain the capacity for autonomy
through their relationships with others. 114 As Nedelsky observes:
Ifwe ask ourselves what actually enables people to be autonomous, the answer is not
isolation, but relationships -with parents, teachers, friends, loved ones - that provide
the support and guidance necessary for the development and experience ofautonomy. 115
Nevertheless, since these relationships have the potential either to nourish or to
diminish autonomy.U" state action is essential to cultivate and to preserve the
structures of relationships in which people experience the fullest autonomy possible.
First, the state is central to the process ofdeveloping in human beings their capacity
for self-determination (consider, for example, the role of education). Second, law is
essential to prevent violations of autonomy by others. In each respect, therefore, it is
apparent that state action need not contradict the idea of autonomy, but may instead be
necessary for its very realization.
RESOLVING FAMILY DISPUTES
The alternative conceptions of law and autonomy developed in the previous section
have two implications for the resolution of intra-familial disputes. First, in contrast
to traditional communitarianism, intra-familial disputes may be subject to legal
regulation without contradicting the very existence of the family. Second, in contrast
to liberal-contractualism, the manner of this regulation need not correspond to
traditional modes of adjudication in which the respective claims of isolated individuals
are separated and ranked. Instead, as recent feminist scholarship has explained, 117 it
114. Ibid. at 4.
115. Ibid. at 6. In this respect, she suggests, "the most promising model, symbol, or metaphor for
autonomy is not [as in liberal theory1 property, but childrearing." Ibid.
116. Again, the childrearing model is illustrative: "parents are both a source of a child's autonomy and a
potential threat to it." Ibid. at 15.
117. See, e.g., Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Womens' Development,
(Cambridge, Mass., 1982). See also Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminist Approach to Ethics
and Moral Education, (Berkeley, Calif., 1984); Sheila Mullett,"Shifting Perspective: a New
Approach to Ethics," in Lorraine Code, Sheila Mullett and Christine Overall, eds., Feminist
Perspectives: Philosophical Essays on Method and Morals, (Toronto, 1988) ; virginia Held,
"Non-Contractual Society: A Feminist View" in Marsha Hanen and Kai Nielsen, eds., Science,
Morality and Feminist Theory, (Calgary, 1987). While in much feminist writing the "justice"
and "care" approaches are said 10 represent two distinctive fOnDS attributed to gender differences,
this article leaves open the question of etiology. Carol Gilligan uses the tenus "justice" and
"care" to differentiate the two ethical and legal approaches. We prefer to speak of the "liberal" or
"separative" and "relational" approaches, recognizing that the concept "justice" captures a
value or ideal that we wish to preserve, though not in its liberal trappings. It is possible, therefore,
to posit a concept of relational justice which resembles more closely Gilligan's care approach.
On the other hand, the ethic of care begins from a conception of the self which is relational and
interdependent in contrast to the liberal atomistic and separative self and generates a method of
dispute resolution from this perspective of connection and interdependence. While one value such
an approach generates is that of care and caring, the values of non-subordination and respect for
difference are also likely to flow from a relational-contextual approach. Therefore the approach is
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is possible to develop alternative approaches to dispute-settlement, emphasizing
relationships between persons rather than claims over things. Drawing upon the
assurance that relational alternatives to adversarial and separative methods of
adjudication do indeed exist, we will argue that a relational approach to dispute
resolution is particularly apt in the context of the family.
Central to the relational approach is a conception of relationships "where
awareness of the connection between people gives rise to a recognition of
responsibility for one another, a perception of the need for a response."llB This ethic
sees "actors in [a] dilemma arrayed not, as opponents in a contest of [individual]
rights, but as members of a network of relationships on whose continuation they all
depend."!'? The method of conflict resolution suggested by this approach depends
not on a hierarchical ordering of claims, but on attending to context and the needs of
all parties involved. Accordingly, moral problems arise from conflicting responsibili-
ties and require for their resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual and narrative
rather than formal and abstract. 120
The separative model of moral and legal reasoning, on the other hand, "values
hierarchical thinking based on the logic of reasoning from abstract, universal
principles.v'P' As a system of logic and law, mediated impersonally, conflict is
thought to be resolved through logical deduction where each element of a dispute is
viewed as discrete and separate. This model of moral and legal dispute resolution is at
odds with a relational approach which envisions the world not through a system of
rules but through human connection.
For Gilligan, the contrast between separative and relational ethics lies in differing
conceptions of the self - a contrast "between a self defmed through separation and a
self delineated through connection. ,,122 Furthermore, as she notes, these two ethics
yield divergent resolutions of a conflict between responsibilities to others and
responsibility to self. The separative approach begins with a responsibility to the self
and then considers the extent to which one is responsible to others as well:
"Proceeding from a premise of separation but recognizing that we have to live with
other people, [it] seeks rules to limit interference and thus to minimize hurt."123
Conversely, to analyze conflicting responsibilities from the standpoint of relation,
one begins from the premise of connection. Instead of applying an abstract rule to
yield a principled or, at least, determinative outcome, one proceeds contextually
not exclusively about care, but about relations. Furthermore, while we do find persuasive the
idea that certain values, characteristics and behavior are gendered (that is, that differences are a
product of social construction, not of biology), we are aware that such a view is problematic.
The risk is in perpetuating stereotypes that prevent us from seeing the characteristics as characteris-
tics without their gendered context.
118. Gilligan, ibid. at 30.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid. at 19.
121. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, "Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering
Process" (1985), 1 Berkeley Women's L.J. 39 at 45.
122. Gilligan, supra, note 117 at 29.
123. Ibid. at 37.
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"indicating how choice would be affected by variation in character and circum-
stance.,,124 Thus, while the separative approach conceptualizes responsibility as
limitation and not an extension of action, relational responsibility entails a positive
act of recognizing and responding to the needs of others rather than the restraint of
aggression.
An application of the two ethics described above to the legal system and to the
process of legal decision-making yields significantly different approaches and
outcomes. The basic structure of the current form of legal-decision making is
adversarial in nature. The judicial process comes into play over a clash of abstract,
individual rights and the legal system claims to decide between these clashing rights
through an application of abstract and universal rules or standards. Thus, in the ideal
situation, the matching of facts with rules yields a decision of objective certainty
which can be repeated for any similar case. However, as Ann Scales notes, in the
"real world" the means become ends and the abstract rules displace and even distort
the real facts of the situation. 125 Furthermore, by privileging the values of hierarchy,
competition and separation, the current adversarial model works through a process of
negation of the other where, in any legal dispute, there is always a winner and a loser.
Thus, in making distinctions, the law divides rather than integrates. 126
A relational approach to dispute-settlement, on the other hand, looks for a solution
that is consistent with the context of the dispute. In contrast with the abstracting and
hierarchical ordering of claims employed by the separative model, the relational
approach "tries to account for all the parties' needs, and searches for a way to find a
solution that satisfies the needs of both."I2? To do this, the context of any particular
dispute must be expanded before attending to its resolution. The adversarial nature of
the process must be diminished and the primary procedural function of the legal
system becomes the facilitation of dialogue to encourage the parties to reach a
decision.
Moreover, at the same time that we encourage direct communication between the
parties as a means ofconflict resolution, we become less concerned about the creation
of a precedent ofuniversal applicability and more attentive to the context in which the
dispute is embedded.P" In the context of custody, this would yield a case-by-case
124. Ibid. at 38.
125. Ann Scales, "The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay" (1986), 95 Yale L.J. 1373 at
1377. Similarly, Carrie Menkel-Meadow notes that " ... equity begins to develop its own harsh
rules of law and universalistic regulations applied to discretionary decisions, undermining the
flexibility that discretion is supposed to protect." Menkel-Meadow, supra, note 121 at 50.
126. This legal model "assumes competition over the same limited item and assumes that success is
measured by maximizing individual gain." Menkel-Meadow, ibid. at 51. In the context of
custody, the item is the child or children and sole custody is the maximum form of individual gain.
127. Ibid. at 51. Speaking of the connection between law and the relational approach, Ann Scales writes
that "relational reasoning is law's soul, that law's duty is to enhance, rather than to ignore, the
rich diversity of life. Yet this purpose is not obvious, it is obscured by the myth of objectivity ....
Feminism inverts the primacy of rules over facts. Feminist method stresses that mechanisms of
law - language, rules and categories - are all merely means for economy in thought and commun-
ication." Scales, supra, note 125 at 1387-88.
128. See Menkel-Meadow, supra, note 121 at 58.
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approach to the resolution of disputes, without any overriding rule or presumption.
Furthermore, by expanding the context of the dispute to allow participation by all
whose interests might be affected, law must look to the complex web of family
relationships in facilitating a particular outcome.
The Basic Structure of Contemporary Custody Law
The most conspicuous feature of contemporary custody law is its central axiom that
all disputes concerning access and child custody are to be determined solely on the
basis of ''the best interests of the child."129 This section examines this welfare principle
alternatively from the perspectives of intra-familial dispute-settlement and child
protection.
DISPUTE-SETTLEMENT AND THE WELFARE PRINCIPLE
As a standard by which to resolve specific disputes over particular aspects of child
custody, the best interests of the child test is particularly curious. As numerous
observers have remarked, custody determinations under the welfare principle differ
markedly from the paradigmatic form of private adjudication. 130
First, while the focus of traditional adjudication is uniformly retrospective,
evaluating past acts and events against judicially elaborated norms to govern the
specific relationship giving rise to the dispute, custody decisions based on the best
interests of the child are implicitly forward-looking, based on the court's assessment
as to the optimal placement to promote the future welfare of the child.P! In this
respect, moreover, while private adjudication is characteristically non-instrumental
in character, professing to "do justice" between the parties rather than to pursue some
extrinsic policy goal, contemporary custody litigation is explicitly dedicated toward
the specific objective of enhancing child welfare.
Second, because contemporary custody law endeavours to promote the future
welfare of the child, the court must embark upon a wide-ranging inquiry into the
merits of each possible custody arrangement and the relative advantages and
disadvantages that each parent offers to the child. Thus, as Lon Fuller has remarked,
while adjudication typically entails "act-oriented" determinations, custody litigation
under the best interests standard involves "person-oriented" determinations. 132 Joan
Wexler describes the distinction admirably as follows:
In most other litigation, the result will depend upon the court's determination that some
event did or did not take place at an earlier time. Aside from possibly bearing on
credibility, the litigants' personality, priorities, lifestyle, financial resources, emotional
stability, and other personal attributes have no relevance to the outcome. In custody
129. CLRA,s. 24(1); DA (1985), s. 16(8).
130. See, e.g. Mnookin, supra, note 1 at 249-55.
131. Ibid. at 251-52.
132. Lon Fuller, "Interaction Between Law and Its Social Context," cited in ibid. at 250.
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litigation, however - at least under the best interests [test] - those very factors will
determine the result in largemeasure, with the courtmakinga judgmentas to whether
the child is likely to be "better off' with one parentthan with the other.133
Thus, custody determinations based on the child welfare principle make central
precisely those issues excluded from consideration in most private adjudication.
Consequently, while the adversary system traditionally leaves to the parties them-
selves the right "to prove their entitlement to the remedy requested.t'P" the conduct
of litigation under contemporary custody law assigns far greater authority to the court
to determine the course of the trial. Thus, for example, the Ontario Court of Appeal
stated in Gordon v. Gordon that:
A custodycase, where the best interestof the child is the only issue, is not the sameas
ordinarylitigationandrequires, in ourview, that thepersonconducting thehearingtake
a more activerole than he ordinarily wouldtake in the conductof a trial. I35
Moreover, provincial legislation contemplates the appointment of an independent
expert "to assess and report to the court on the needs of the child and the ability and
willingness of the parties ... to satisfy the needs of the child.',136
Fourth, the instrumental and "person-oriented" character of contemporary custody
determinations confers enormous discretion on the presiding judge to dictate the
family's post-separation custody arrangements according to his or her (but over-
whelmingly his) own conception of what is in the best interests of the individual child
and of children generally. While considerable discretion is not unknown in other
areas of private law, such a widespread grant of discretionary· power is virtually
unheard of.
Finally, the tremendous breadth of judicial discretion under the best interests
standard has significant implications for both the role of precedent and the scope of
appellate review under contemporary custody law. 137 While these mechanisms
generally serve to confine and structure discretion, their influence is narrowly
circumscribed in the context of contemporary custody litigation. Because the child
welfare principle entails "person-oriented" determinations, previous decisions
merely suggest specific factors that may be considered. 138 In the [mal analysis, the
courts are quick to explain, each case must be decided on its own facts. For the very
133. Joan Wexler, "Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees" (1985), 94 Yale L.J. 757 at
762.
134. Rosalie Abella, "Procedural Aspects of Arrangements for Children Upon Divorce in Canada"
(1983),61 Can. Bar Rev. 443 at 451.
135. (1980),23 R.F.L. (2d) 266 at 271 (Ont. C.A.).
136. CLRA, s. 30(1). Furthermore, the court may require the parents and the child "to attend for
assessment by the person appointed by the order." CLRA, s. 30(5). The Act contains the
ominous warning that in the event of such a refusal, "the court may draw such inferences in respect
of the ability and willingness of any person to satisfy the needs of the child as the court
considers appropriate." CLRA, s. 30(6).
137. Mnookin, supra, note I at 253-54.
138. See, e.g., Catton, supra, note 4 at 341.
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same reason, moreover, appellate courts are extremely loathe to reverse a trial
decision where the judge has the advantage of seeing and assessing the parties. In
Talsky v. Talsky,139 for example, the Supreme Court of Canada approved the
following standard of appellate review, enunciated a quarter century earlier by the
Privy Council:
[Since] the questionof custodyof an infant is a matterwhichpeculiarlylies withinthe
discretionof the learnedjudge who hears the case and has the opportunity generally
denied to an appellate tribunal of seeing the parties and investigating the infant's
circumstances ... his decision should not be disturbed unless he has clearly acted on
somewrong principleor disregarded material evidence.140
What is more, so long as the trial decision is careful to connect each argument for the
specific outcome to an interpretation of the child's welfare, it is difficult to imagine
how any judge could "act on some wrong principle", since as Susan Maidment points
out: "All matters are relevant if the judge thinks they are. ,,141
CHILD PROTECTION AND THE WELFARE PRINCIPLE
The striking contrast between the traditional adjudicative form and the basic structure
of contemporary custody law suggests that the best interests test is informed more by
considerations of child protection than by notions of intra-familial dispute-settlement.
Indeed, the child protection rationale for the primacy of the best interests standard
has been asserted most forcefully by Joseph Goldstein, Albert Solnit and Anna Freud
in their highly influential book Beyond the Best Interests of the Child. 142
For Goldstein.et, al., maximum child welfare is generally achieved by the initial
placement of children with their natural parents.l''" and by legal recognition of the
liberty rights of all parents "to raise their children as they see fit, free of government
intrusion, except in cases of neglect and abandonment.t'J''" Drawing on Freudian
psychoanalytic theory, they contend that this policy protects "the intricate develop-
mental processes of childhood'v'" by securing for each child "direct, intimate, and
continuous care by the adults who are personally committed to assume such
responsibility. "146
According to this perspective, however, the circumstances upon which placement
with the natural or adoptive parents was initially justified no longer hold whenever
separated parents seek the assistance of a court to sort out their respective rights and
139. [1976] 2 S.C.R. 292.
140. McKee v. McKee, [1951]1 All E.R. 942 at 945 (p.C.), per Lord Simonds.
141. Maidment, supra, note 73 at 57.
142. Goldstein, Solnit and Freud, supra, note 8.
143. Ibid. at 6.
144. Ibid. at 7.
145. Goldstein, supra, note 33 at 51.
146. Goldstein, Solnit and Freud, supra, note 8 at 3.
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obligations regarding the custody of a child. Since successful child development
requires children to perceive parents as "omniscient and all-powerful.v'"? the display
of ordinary human fallibility inherent in their assent to the higher authority of the court
and the law shatters "the protective shell of the family," 148 and places the child at risk
of emotional harm.
While Goldstein et. al. are nowhere clear as to the specific likelihood or severity of
such emotional harm, 149 nor for that matter in the conviction that parental inability to
agree upon post-separation child custody arrangements itselfconfirms that the child is
in need of protection, the latter conclusion is implicit in the manner in which they
understand the custody decision. First, as Goldstein insists, when the parents "fail to
frnd their own way of resolving their disagreements about custody, [they] in effect,
temporarily give up an important part of their autonomy.t'P? Second, once this
"justification for state intervention" is established, 151 the interests of the child should
be the "paramount consideration.v'Y In these two stages, therefore, custody
determinations adopt an identical sequence to that of the child protection hearing -
except that in the former case, the very presence of the parents before the court is
taken as conclusive evidence that the child is in need of protection.
Where custody law is informed primarily by principles of child protection, the
custody decision necessarily involves the imposition of extrinsic values upon the
individual family before the court. On the other hand, unlike specific child protection
legislation, this process is not limited to the standards of minimally acceptable
methods of parenting, nor subject to explicit procedural safeguards designed to
protect family autonomy. 153 Thus, the best interests test permits considerable scope
for the presidirig court to impose an alien set of norms upon the family and its
individual members.
For Goldstein, Solnit and Freud, these norms have a recognizably communitarian
character. Children are categorically "incomplete beings who are not fully competent
to determine and safeguard their own interests.,,154 Consequently, recognition of
their voice in the custody decision is inconceivable. On the contrary, they are
uniformly "at risk, dependent.t'P" and in need of "unbroken continuity of
affectionate and stimulating relationships with an adult,,156 whose authority must be
147. Goldstein, supra, note 33 at 50.
148. Ibid. at 49.
149. According to provincial child protection legislation, a declaration that a child is "in need of
protection" because of existing or impending emotional harm requires that the emotional harm
be "demonstrated by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or self-destructive of agggressive
behaviour." CFSA, ss. 37(2)(f),(g). Furthermore, the courts have imposed an especially
onerous burden of proof on those who would interfere with family autonomy by seeking such a
declaration. See, e.g., Re Chrysler (1978),5 R.F.L. (2d) 50 at 58 (Ont. Prov. Ct.).
150. Goldstein, supra, note 33 at 51.
151. Ibid. at 49.
152. Goldstein, Solnit and Freud, supra, note 8 at 105.
153. For a useful summary of these principles, see Phillips, supra, note 50.
154. Goldstein, Solnit and Freud, supra, note 8 at 3.
ISS. Goldstein, supra, note 33 at 49.
156. Goldstein, Solnit and Freud, supra, note 8 at 6.
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decisive if the child is to have "confidence in [the] parent's power to shield [the child]
from threats from the outside.,,157 Since this protective realm of the family is
shattered where parents call upon the courts to decide contested aspects of
post-separation custody arrangements, explains Goldstein, "the goal of intervention
must be to ... recreate a family for the child as quickly as possible.t'P"
Finally, the authors' conception of the family as a sphere of affective relationships
separate from legal regulation suggests narrow restrictions on acceptable arrange-
ments for post-separation child custody. 159 Since, on this account, the regulation of
family relationships by law would both undermine the requirements of proper child.
development'P'' and subject family members to "the coercive force of the state,,,161
Goldstein et. al. are implacably opposed to the continued jurisdiction of the courts to
vary a previous custody order,162 and above all to any post-separation custody
arrangement in which parents and/or children obtain legally enforceable rights -
either by court order or through voluntary agreements entered into by the parents
themselves. 163 In each case, argues Goldstein:
... the court, by directing [the child] to act against the express wishes of the custodial
parent, casts doubt on that parent's authority and capacity to parent. It damages,
particularly for the younger child, his [or her] confidence in his [or her] parent's power to
shield him [or her] from threats from the outside. It invites the older child to manipulate
his [or her] parents by invoking the higher authority of the court rather than to learn to
work things out with the custodial parent. 164
Instead, therefore, whenever the courts are called upon to resolve a specific custody
dispute, Goldstein et. al. advise orders for exclusive custody to one parent, thereby
depriving the other of all legally enforceable rights with respect to any aspect of the
custody of the child. 165 Although not opposed to visitation by and consultation with
the non-custodial parent, the authors conclude that it is for custodial parents
themselves, and not for the law, to arrange any sharing of physical or legal custody.166
The Contours of Canadian Custody Determinations
While Canadian custody law enshrines the welfare of the child as the sole
consideration in all custody determinations, neither the courts nor the legislatures
have accepted wholesale the psychological theories ofchild development upon which
157. Goldstein, supra, note 33 at 53.
158. Ibid. at 49.
159. Goldstein, SoInit and Freud, supra, note 8 at 6.
160. Goldstein, supra, note 33 at 48.
161. Ibid. at 48.
162. Goldstein, SoInit and Freud, supra, note 8 at 6.
163. Goldstein, supra, note 33 at 52-55.
164. Ibid. at 53.
165. Goldstein, SoInit and Freud, supra, note 8 at 6-7.
166. Goldstein, supra, note 33 at 52-53.
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the best interests test appears to be based. Thus, for example, regardless of the actual
custody order made by the court, the law almost always.recognizes the noncustodial
parent's "residual rights" of access and guardianship.l''? So too, the courts retain
continuing jurisdiction to vary a previous custody order where "there has been a
material change in circumstances" in the intervening period. 168 Finally, the judiciary
has been willing to attach legal significance to the custody provisions of separation
agreements, interpreting these arrangements to accord each parent legally enforce-
able rights with respect to the custody of the child. 169 ,-
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to underestimate the extent to which child
psychology and traditional communitarian notions of family privacy influence the
manner in which Canadian law addresses specific custody disputes. In Frame v.
Smith,170 for example, where the custodial mother had deliberately and consistently
impeded access by the non-custodial father (as stipulated in the original court order),
the Supreme Court of Canada embraced a traditional conception of the "private
family" by dismissing the father's claim for tort damages on the grounds of "the
desirability of provoking suits within the family circle."!"
More generally, notwithstanding their affirmation of the residual rights of
non-custodial parents, Canadian courts typically interpret the best interests of the
child to require an order of sole custody to one parent, usually with liberal access to
the other. In this resect, it is appropriate to speak of a sole custody presumption as
guiding current Canadian custody determinations. So too, the courts have increasingly
turned to the theories of Goldstein, Solnit and Freud to guide their selection of the sole
custodial parent. This section examines the judicial rationale for thispresumption of
167. See, e.g., Doiron v. Doiron (1978),1 F.L.R. 214 at 215 (p.E.I. S.C. Faro. Div.). For purposes of
clarity, we define access as the "physical" component of these rights (regarding physical
contact with the child), and guardianship as the "legal" aspect of these rights (involving rights of
participation in decisions concerning the upbringing of the child).
168. CLRA, ss. 29, 20(7). Similar wording appears in s. 175) of the DA (1985), requiring "a change in
the condition, means, needs or other circumstances of the child ... since the making of the
custody order or the last variation order."
169. See, e.g., Crawford v. Crawford (1985),46 R.F.L. (2d) 331 (p.E.I. S.C.); Chauvin v. Chauvin
(1987), 6 R.F.L. (3d) 403 (ant. Dist. Ct.).
170. (1987),9 R.F.L. (3d) 225 (S.C.C.).
171. Ibid. at 258, per Laforest 1. As with Minow's analysis of Goss v. Lopez, supra, note 99 and
accompanying text, that "conflict was present long before anyone asserted in court that the
students had rights," so too it is clear in Frame that the real "provocation" was not the father's
lawsuit, but the mother's conduct in depriving the father of any relationship with his children
(however, it is also likely, although the judgment itself provides no details, that the real origins of
the conflict lie much deeper in the relationship between the parents during cohabitation). Thus,
as a basis for the Court's decision in Frame, "the undesirability of provoking suits within the
family circle" represents a particularly poor rationale. Far more persuasive would have been the
manifest unsuitability of the tort remedy of money damages sought by the father, and the need to
convey to the legislature the urgency of designing more effective and more sensitive mechanisms
for the enforcement of access orders. In this respect, both Newfoundland and Manitoba have
legislated specific mechanisms for the enforcement of access orders, and a bill that would
establish a similar plan in Ontario has recently passed second reading in the provincial legislature.
See Dorothy Lipovenki, "Parents, lawyers split on proposed bill to enforce child access,"
Globe & Mail (14 February 1989) A8.
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sole custody'?" and then looks at the methods by which Canadian courts have
determined the parent who is awarded sole custody. 173
SOLE CUSTODY PRESUMPTION
Ten years after their initial enunciation, the leading Canadian pronouncements on
the customary form of custody order remain the decisions of the Ontario Court of
Appeal in Baker v. Baker'?" and Kruger v Kruger. 175 Here, by restricting court-
ordered joint custody to "the exceptional circumstances which are rarely, if ever,
present in cases of disputed custody,,,176 the Court effectively established a strong
presumption in favour of sole custody - a presumption that appears to have been
relaxed, but not abandoned, by more recent judicial and legislative developments. 177
In Baker, the father appealed from the trial judgment ordering joint legal custody
with care and control of the eight-year-old boy to the mother. 178 At trial, Boland J.
had spoken glowingly of joint custody as a means of ensuring the continued
"participation and influence" of both parents in the child's life, and of assisting
separated parents "to fmd stability for their future relationships with their children"
and to "understand that divorce is not the dissolution of a family but merely its
reorganlzation.v'?? Remarking that the increasingly common "breakdown of the
traditional family" demands "new ways of defining post-divorce family structures,"
and declaring that the courts "must be responsive to the winds of change," she
suggested that
(i]t would seem logical to begin with a presumption in favour of joint custody, as
children who fare best after a divorce are those who are free to develop full and loving
relationships with both parents. ISO
In particular, she recommended that
[j]oint custody should be considered in cases where there are two parents who are well
qualified to give affection and guidance to the child and where it can be reasonably
172. Infra, notes 174--199 and accompanying text.
173. Infra, notes 200-289 and accompanying text.
174. (1979),8 R.F.L. (2d) 236 (Ont, C.A.) [hereinafter Baker].
175. (1979), 11 R.F.L. (2d) 52 at 78 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter Kruger].
176. Baker, supra, note 174 at 246.
177. In 1985, the federal Divorce Act was amended to provide inter alia that the court could grant
custody or access "to anyone or more persons." DA (1985), s. 16(4). A similar provision was
included in 1984 amendments to the Children's Law Reform Act: CLRA, s. 28(a). See also
Parsons v. Parsons (1985), 48 R.F.L. (2d) 83 (Nfld. V.F.C.) [hereinafter Parsons];Abbot v.
Taylor (1986) 2 R.F.L. (3d) 163 at 170 (Man C.A.); Nurmi v. Nurmi (1988),16 R.F.L. (3d) 201
at 207 (Ont. V.F.C.).
178. Baker v. Baker (1978),3 R.F.L. (2d) 193 at 196 (ant. H.C.).
179. Ibid. at 197.
180. Ibid.
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contemplated that theyare capableofco-operating witheachotherinthebestinterests of
the children.181
Finally, by recommending that the parents select an arbitrator to help settle future
disagreements, 182 she indicated that joint custody remains a viable option even where
subsequent differences between the parents may be anticipated.
The Court of Appeal, however, saw matters quite differently, Emphasizing that
previous cases had regarded joint custody as "an exceptional disposition, reserved for
a limited category of separated parents,,,183 it ordered a new trial on the grounds that
[t]helearnedtrial judge askedherselfthewrongquestion. Insteadofaskingwhichparent
would best promote the welfareof the boy, she startedfrom the presumption that both
were fit parents entitled to joint custody.184
First of all, the Court of Appeal questioned the empirical validity of Boland J. 's
unsupported views on the alleged advantages of joint custody.P" Instead, citing
Weatherston J. (as he then was) in McCahill v. RobertsonP" it adopted the equally
unsubstantiated, but conventionally assumed, position that healthy child develop-
ment necessitates absolute parental authority:
A child must know where its home is and to whom it must look for guidance and
admonition and the personhavingcustodyand havingthatresponsibility musthavethe
opportunity to exerciseit withoutanyfeelingby theinfantthatit canlookelsewhere.187
Second, the Court challenged Boland J.'s assessment that the parents could
reasonably be expected to cooperate in a court-orderedjoint custody arrangement. On
the contrary, it held, the record at trial and the appellate proceeding itself
demonstrated both the inability and the unwillingness of the two parents "to
co-operate as loving parents.,,188 Nevertheless, as the Court's emphasis on the term
"loving parents" suggests, this conclusion did not so much contradict the Boland J.'s
findings of fact as it reflected a significantly higher standard of cooperation for a joint
custody arrangement than that considered necessary at trial. Specifically, given the
appellate Court's assumptions regarding appropriate child development, it follows
that joint custody is consistent with the welfare of the child only where the parents
181. Ibid.
182. Ibid. at 298.
183. Baker, supra, note 174 at 245.
184. Ibid. at 247.
185. Ibid. at 244.
186. (1974), 17 R.F.L. 23 (Ont. H.C.).
187. Ibid. at 23-24, cited in Baker, supra, note 174 at 246. The use of the pronoun "it" in this passage
reflects an unfortunate tendency in the law of custody to objectify children as possessions or
less-than-human beings.
188. Baker, supra, note 174 at 245.
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cooperate to such a high degree that legal regulation itself is rendered unnecessary. In
this respect, therefore, while Boland J. was willing to admit the possibility of
subsequent disagreements (to be resolved by arbitration), the Court of Appeal
adhered to a communitarian notion of the family as a sphere of intimate relationships
with respect to which legal regulation is antithetical.
The Kruger decision, delivered less than six months earlier, was little more than a
replay of Baker, with Wilson J.A. (as she then was) cast in the role of Boland J., and
Thorson and Arnup JJ.A. reiterating the Court's earlier position in Baker. 189
Nonetheless, the case is useful to consider since it makes even more explicit the
communitarian assumptions that underlie the expression of the sole custody presump-
tion in Baker.
In Kruger, the father appealed from an order of maternal sole custody, in which he
had been granted "reasonable and liberal" access. 190 Although the parents had clearly
cooperated in a de facto shared parenting arrangement for two years prior to the trial,
a majority of the Court, Wilson J.A. (as she then was) dissenting, dismissed the
father's plea for joint custody on the grounds that court-imposed joint custody is
unworkable, and that the mother had demonstrated her unwillingness to accept joint
custody by the very action of contesting the father's petition on appeal. 191 In effect,
the Court concluded, joint custody should be ordered only when such an order is
unnecessary, because the parties have already agreed to joint custody. 192
In dissent, Wilson J .A. (as she was then) echoed the views of Boland J. in Baker.
First, she maintained, the best interests of the child usually dictate that the courts not
choose between the parents, but rather that they "do everything possible to maintain
the child's relationship with both parents.,,193 While sole custody orders secure
absolute parental authority for the custodial parent, they transform the non-custodial
parent into a mere "visitor," a process that represents "a traumatic experience for
a child, frequently attended by feelings of rejection and guilt. ,,194
Second, she explained,although separation or divorce necessarily severs the bond
between the parents, it need not terminate the relationship that each parent has with
his or her children. 195 The breakdown of the parental relationship should be viewed
not as the dissolution of the family, but instead as a process through which the family
is restructured in a different form. In this respect, moreover, it is mistaken to assume
that the often intense personal conflict accompanying a separation or divorce, nor
even the existence of a custody dispute itself, evidences irrevocable parental inability
189. In fact, Thorson J.A. participated in both decisions, concurring with the decision of Lacourciere
J.A. in Baker, and delivering the majority decision in Kruger.
190. Kruger, supra, note 175 at 75.
191. Ibid. at 79, 82.
192. Parsons, supra, note 177 at 88, per Cameron J.
193. Kruger, supra, note 175 at 69.
194. Ibid. at 73.
195. "[Wjhile placing care and control of a child and the making of day-to-day decisions in one parent or
the other is a necessary consequence of the fact that husbands and wives stop living together
when their marriage ends, terminating the participation of parents in the long-range aspects of their
children's lives is not." Ibid. at 70.
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to cooperate in a joint custody arrangement. 196 On the contrary, argued Wilson J.A.
(as she then was):
Most mature adults, after the initial trauma has worn off, are able to overcome the
hostility attendant on the dissolution of their marriages or at the very least are capable of
subserving it to the interests of their children. This is particularly so now that the social
stigma attending divorce has all but disappeared and men and women are picking
themselves up and putting their lives together again. 197
In any event, she added, even where subsequent disagreements do arise, there is no
reason why the parents cannot resort to the courts to seek a resolution. 198
Finally, therefore, Wilson J.A. (as she then was) favoured a fundamentally
different standard to evaluate the appropriateness of a joint custody order from that
proposed by the Court of Appeal in Baker and followed by the majority in Kruger.
Instead of requiring a degree of cooperation that renders the need for legal regulation
superfluous, she declared, the court should recognize continued participation by both
parents as the general rule, limiting this involvement only "if the state of the husband
and wife relationship is such as to make it necessary or desirable to do so. "199 Thus,
she joined with Boland J. in recommending a presumption of joint rather than sole
custody.
The striking similarities between both pairs of decisions bear some comment. It
should not go unmentioned that of the eight judges involved in both decisions, six
men ordered sole custody while the two women favoured joint custody. In this
respect, the male and female judges reflected markedly different conceptions of the
family. While Boland J. and Wilson J.A. (as she then was) recognized diversity of
opinion, conflict and regulation by law as not inconsistent with family life, the
remaining judges , all of them men, adhered to a traditional conception of the family in
which disagreement must be suppressed rather than openly acknowledged and
addressed, where parental authority must be absolute, and where legal regulation is
both interventionist and coercive. Furthermore, while both female judges empha-
sized the relational character of the family and the potential for law to mediate and
facilitate such relationships when the family is restructured upon marital breakdown,
196. "We accept now, I believe, that men and women who fall short as spouses may nevertheless excel
as parents. We have also become increasingly aware over the last number of years that the
context of a divorce action is the worst possible context in which to form an assessment of the
spouses as people let alone as parents. The adversarial process by its nature requires each
spouse to attack the other in order to protect his or her economic interests. This has caused an undue
emphasis to be placed at trial on the deterioration of the husband and wife relationship and not
enough on the parent and child relationship." Ibid. at 69.
197. Ibid. at 73.
198. "And what if occasional resort has to be made to the courts when the parents cannot agree on a
major matter affecting the child? Is this to be the determinative consideration? It seems to me to
be a modest price to pay in order to preserve a child's confidence in the love of his parents and with
it his own sense of security and self-esteem." Ibid.
199. Ibid. at 70.
904 Toronto, Faculty of Law Review Volume 47, Supplement
the male judges refused to acknowledge that a new family form might exist
post-divorce - thereby effectively severing one of the parent-child relationships.
INTERPRETING BEST INTERESTS
As more than one commentator has pointed out, the welfare principle itself is
inherent!y indetenninate.P? Not only must decision-makers divine the future if they
are to assess the prospects ofeach available placement option;201 they must also adopt
a particular set of values in order to interpret the meaning of "the best interests of the
child." But as Mnookin explains:
Decidingwhatis best for a childposesa question no lessultimatethanthepurposes and
valuesof life itself. Shouldthe judge be primarilyconcerned with a child's happiness?
Or with the child's spiritualand religious training?Shouldthejudge be concerned with
the economic "productivity" of the child when he [or she] growsup? Are the primary
valuesin life in warm, interpersonal relationships, or in discipline andself-sacrifice? Is
stabilityand securityfor a childmore desirable than intellectual stimulation?202
Not surprisingly, then, the manner in which both courts and legislators have
interpreted the best interests ofthe child tells us less about the actual welfare (however
defined) of the individual children involved than it does about prevailing societal
norms, scientific theories and judicial assumptions regarding childhood needs and
family life. For contemporary custody determinations, therefore, the implications of
the welfare principle are threefold: first, to the extent that current conceptions of
family life have become increasingly pluralistic, the resolution of custody disputes
has become correspondingly indeterminate; second, in the face of this indeterminacy,
courts have increasingly turned to the behavioural sciences for ostensibly precise and
objective answers; third, notwithstanding this reliance on psychological theory,
judicial interpretations of the child's best interests continue to reveal the cultural
biases of a judiciary whose composition is far from representative of society as a
whole. Aside from the dominant societal assumptions regarding appropriate family
life andlor prevailing scientific theories regarding healthy child development, the best
interests of the child are nothing more nor less than what the presiding judge happens
to say they are.
Historical Background
It is perhaps not surprising that the triumph of the welfare principle as the paramount
consideration in all custody disputes corresponds with the rising influence of
psychological theory in the 1920s, especially Freudian theories of child development
200. See, e.g., Mnookin, supra, note 1 at 255-61;
201. Ibid. at 257-60. See also Freeman, Rights and Wrongs ofChildren, supra, note 71 at 202.
202. Mnookin, supra, note 1 at 260.
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and maternal attachment.P'' Conceiving as natural and universal a culturally and
historically specific form of family life in which childrearing is typically carried out
by women in "private" families, these theories and the conventional notions which
accompanied them had an enormous influence upon both the structure of custody law
and outcomes of actual custody disputes. Above all, the development of the best
interests test signalled the decline of proprietorial notions of fathers' sacred rights to
the custody of their children.F'" and the emergence of a strong presumption of
maternal custody, especially in the case of very young children.
In Canadian law, the classic expression of this "tender years" doctrine is the 1955
case of Bell v Bell. 205 In awarding sole custody of the young daughter to the mother,
the Ontario Court of Appeal pronounced:
No father, no matter how well-intentioned or how solicitous for the welfare of such a
child can take the full place of the mother. Instinctively, a little child, particularly a little
girl, turns to her mother in her troubles and her fears .... This is nothing new; it is as old
as human nature and has been recognized time after time in the decisions of our Courts. 206
As late as 1976, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada referred to "the view that
children of tender years should be given to the custody of their mother" as "a principle
of common sense.,,207 Since then, other Canadian courts have continued to invoke the
doctrine.r'"
While this maternal presumption became the dominant feature of custody
determinations in the fifty years following the emergence of the best interests test in
the 1920s, it never attained the status of the paternal rule that had preceded it. First,
the presumption applied only to young children, so that fathers retained a claim to the
custody of older children. In 1933, for example, the Ontario Court of Appeal
combined both the "tender years" doctrine with common law principles of sole
parental custody to formulate a "general rule" stating:
[T]he mother ... is entitled to the custody and care of a child during what is called the
period of nurture, namely, until it attains about 7 years of age, the time during which it
needs the care of the mother more than that of the father, and then the father as against the
mother becomes entitled to the custody and care of his child.209
203. For a prominent post-war statement of these theories, see John Bowlby, Child Care and the
Growth ofLove, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1953).
204. Maidment, supra, note 73 at 154.
205. [1955] O.W.N. 341 (C.A.).
206. Ibid. at 344.
207. To/sky v . Ta/sky (1976), 21 R.F.L. 27 (S.C.C.).
208. See, e.g., Miron v. Miron (1978), to A.R. 550 (T.D.) [hereinafterMiron]; Re Laverty (1979), 94
D.L.R. (3d) 402 (Sask. Q.B.); Grills v. Grills (1982), 30 R.F.L. (2d) 390 at 399 (Alta. Prov.
o. Fam. Div.).
209. Re Orr (1933), 2 D.L.R. 77 at 80-81 (Ont. C.A.), per Mulock C.J.O.
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Thus, while the father had inherent rights, the mother's entitlement was wholly
derivative upon the welfare of the child.
Second, therefore, unlike the nineteenth century rule of paternal primacy, the
"tender years" doctrine was never based on the mother's rights, but only on the
court's interpretation that maternal custody coincided with the welfare of the child.
Indeed, the underlying reason for the presumption was the view that the interests and
needs of children could be best met by the mother.P? As a result, as one American
court explained, custody would not be awarded to the mother where she displayed
otherwise "undesirable traitS.,,211 Primary among these, in an era when family law
was predicated upon upholding the institution of marriage, was matrimonial fault. 212
Thus, where the mother was found guilty of "adultery" or "desertion," custody was
invariably awarded to the father. In 1962, Lord Denning justified this result "as a
matter of simple justice. ,,213 More generally, the award of custody to the innocent
party was simply rationalized as being in the best interests of the child. 2~4
It was the combination of the traditional theory of matrimonial guilt with the
naturalist assumptions of the "tender years" doctrine that gave birth to the split
custody order, a practice that began in Great Britain in the 1930sY5 Once again, in
the leading case of Wakeham v Wakeham,216 it was Lord Denning who appeared as
the guardian of the sanctity of marriage. Awarding legal custody to the father and
physical custody to the mother, he declared:
Cases often arise in Divorce Court where a guilty wife deserts her husband and takes the
children with her, but the father has no means of bringing them up himself. In such a
situation, the usual order is that the father, the innocent party, is given custody of the child
or children, but care and control is left to the mother. That order is entirely realistic. 217
The New Family Law
Canadian family law has undergone remarkable changes over the past twenty years.
Beginning with the passage of the federal Divorce Act in 1968,218this transformation
has been inspired by two fundamental principles: the juridical equality of men and
women, and the autonomy of spouses and unmarried cohabitants to determine the
form and content of their own relationships free of definition by the state. For custody
law, these developments have had two immediate consequences: first, the disappear-
210. Maidment, supra, note 73 at 182.
211. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 181 NW 826 at 827 (Wis 1921).
212. Maidment, supra, note 73 at 5.
213. Re L (1962), 3 All E.R. 1 at 4 (C.A.), per Denning L.J.
214. As Maidment explains, this interpretation posed no difficulty for the judges of the time since "[i]n
their world-view the child's welfare was actually served by upholding the institutions of the
family and marriage, and in this they were merely reflecting the dominant social ideology."
Maidment, supra, note 73 at 6.
215. Ibid. at 155-56.
216. [1954] 1 All E.R. 434 (C.A.).
217. Ibid. at 436, per Lord Denning.
218. R.S.C. 1970, c. D-8 [hereinafter DA (1968)].
, ,i.
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ance of presumptions based solely upon the gender of the claimant; second, the
decline of matrimonial fault as a basis for awarding custody to the "innocent" party.
The former development is apparent in the recent case of R. v. R., 219 where a
majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal decisively rejected the "tender years"
doctrine as biological determinism. Invoking Albert Einstein's observation that
"common sense is [nothing more than] the collection of prejudices acquired by age
18," Kerans LA. wrote:
That the female human has some intrinsic capacity, not shared by the male, to deal
effectively with infant children is an assumption that was once conventionally accepted
but is now not only doubted but widely rejected. . . . This view confuses cultural
traditions with human nature; it also traps women in a social role not necessarily of their
choosing, while at the same time freeing men: if only a mother can nurture a child of
tender years, then it is the clear duty ofthe mother to do so; because the father cannot do
so, he is neither obliged nor entitled even to try it. Also, it is seen by some as
self-perpetuating: by putting the female child in the custody of somebody who accepts
the maternal role model so described, the rule ordains that she will have just such a role
model at close hand during her most impressionable years. Thus, the "tender years
principle", which at first glance seems only innocently sentimental, is seen by many as
part of a subtle, systemic sexual subordinanon.F"
Although some recent cases suggest that the "tender years" doctrine refuses to die,221
there is little doubt that its disappearance is imminent.
In Canada, the decline of matrimonial fault began with the 1968 Divorce Act,
which first introduced a form ofno-fault divorce. 222 On the other hand, the legislation
retained the traditional grounds of matrimonial misconduct.P" and stipulated that in
making an order for "the custody, care and upbringing of the children of the
marriage," the court should consider "the conduct of the parties" as well as "the
condition, means and other circumstances of each of them.,,224 Thus, while fault
ceased to be a necessary condition for divorce, it remained a necessary consideration
for custody. Only with the 1985 amendments to the federal Divorce Act was
matrimonial guilt expressly abolished as a justifIcation for an award of custody. Even
then, while the law deems past conduct in itself irrelevant to the determination of
custody, it allows such considerations where the court considers the conduct
"relevant to the ability of that person to act as a parent of a child. ,,225 Nevertheless,
219. (1983), 34 R.F.L. (2d) 278 (Alta. C.A.).
220. Ibid. at 285-86.
221. See, e.g., Grills, supra, note 208; Bendale v. Bendale (1985), 48 R.F.L. (2d) 120 (Ont. Prov.
Ct.).
222. DA (1968), s. 4(1)(e).
223. Ibid. s. 3.
224. Ibid. s. 11(1).
225. DA (1985), s. 16(9). Virtually identical wording appears in the Children's Law Reform Act:
CLRA, s. 24(3).
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despite this proviso - which, as the discussion below reveals.F" has allowed
determined judges to reassert notions of fault - the direction of the new family law
away from fault-based custody determinations is unquestionable.
Indeterminacy and the Statutory Guidelines
Together, the decline of the "tender years" doctrine and disappearing theory of
matrimonial fault have rendered custody determinations under the welfare principle
increasingly indeterminate. With the passage of these traditional presumptions,
judges have been left without any consistent source of values from which to impart .
concrete meaning to the vague language of "the best interests of the child".
While several Canadian jurisdictions have attempted to respond to this dilemma by
formulating specific statutory guidelines to structure the court's interpretation of
child welfare, these instructions have been appropriately characterized by Anita
Fineberg as "vague catch-phrases at best and meaningless rhetoric at worst. "227 Thus,
for example, the 1985 Divorce Act stipulates that the court, in determining the best
interests of the child, shall have reference to "the condition, means, needs and other
circumstances of the child.,,228 Similar expressions appear in provincial legislation.229
Even the more detailed considerations enumerated in the Ontario Children's Law
Reform Act are little better. 230
Both singularly and in combination, these factors provide sufficient flexibility to
allow for wide judicial discretion in evaluating the best interests of the child. Thus,
for example, while the court is required to consider "the views and preferences of the
child" this obligation arises only where they can be "reasonably ascertained. ,,231
There is no agreement on how old a child must be before his or her wishes are
considered, the mechanism by which these views are to be taken into account, nor at
what age, if any, the preferences of the child should prevail. More generally, to the
extent that these considerations represent mere guidelines for determining the best
226. Infra, notes 261-271 and accompanying text.
227. Anita Fineberg, "Joint Custody of Infants: Breakthrough or Fad?" (1979), 2 Can. J. Fam. L. 417 at
419.
228. DA (1985), s. 16(8).
229. See, e.g., CLRA, s. 24(2) (instructing the court to consider "all the needs and circumstances of the
child").
230. In addition to "the needs and circumstances of the child" the legislation requires the court to
consider: "(a) the love, affection and emotional ties between the child and, (i) each person
entitled to or claiming custody of or access to the child, (ii) other members of the child's family
who reside with the child, and (iii) persons involved in the care and upbringing of the child; (b)
the views and preferences of the child, where such views and preferences can reasonably be
ascertained; (c) the length of time the child has lived in a stable home environment; (d) the
ability and willingness of each person applying for custody of the child to provide the child with
guidance and education, the necessaries of life and any special needs of the child; (e) any plans
proposed for the care and upbringing of the child; (f) the permanence and stability of the family unit
with which it is proposed that the child will live; and (g) the relationship by blood or through an
adoption order between the child and each person who is a party to the application." CLRA, s.
24(2).
231. Ibid. s. 24(2)(b).
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interests of the child - guidelines which the court itself must-weigh in the context of
the specific dispute before it - they fail to confine the inherent indeterminacy of the
welfare principle.
Behavioural Science and the Status Quo
In the face of this manifest uncertainty, the courts have increasingly looked to the
behavioural sciences to supply supposedly clear and objective answers. On one level,
provincial legislation authorizes the court to order expert assessments of the claimants
and the child,232 and parents themselves may present psychological evidence to
support their respective claims.P" Nevertheless, since definitive conclusions are
virtually impossible to state in the absence of gross psychopathology,234 these opinions
often reflect little more than the unexpressed social values of the mental health
professional.P" Consequently, the courts have been reluctant to delegate effective
decision-making authority to experts, no matter how well qualified, but have
regarded such assessments merely as "helpful factor[s], to be weighted and assessed
along with all other relevant evidence. ,,236
On the other hand, notwithstanding the equally contested character of scientific
theories of child development.P? Canadian courts have implicitly drawn upon the
psychological theories of Goldstein, Solnit and Freud to fashion a new judicial
presumption, favouring sole custody by the adult(s) with whom the child is living
(and has been living for some time) at the time of the trial. 238 Assuming that children
can, or should in their own best interests, tolerate only one psychological parent.P?
this status quo presumption attempts to ensure for the child continuity of care by the
parent who, by virtue of the residential arrangments adopted since the separation, is
most likely to fit the description of the child's "sole psychological parent."
The first clear statement of the status quo presumption in Canadian law was the
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Re Moores and Feldstein. 240 There, the
mother had placed her daughter in the care of the Feldsteins shortly after her birth,
hoping for a reconciliation with her husband, who was not the child's father. Several
months later, when the mother requested the return of the child, the Feldsteins
refused. By the time legal proceedings were initiated and the matter came to trial,
however, the girl was four years old. Although the trial judge awarded custody to the
232. CLRA, s. 30.
233. Abella, supra, note 134 at 459.
234. Rena K. Uviller, "Father's Rights and Feminism: The Maternal Presumption Revisited" (1978), 1
Harv, Worn. L. J. 107 at 125.
235. Mnookin, supra, note 1 at 287.
236. Gauci v. Gauci (1973),9 R.F.L. 189 at 193 (Ont. S.c.).
237. Maidrnent, supra, note 73 at 8. See also Skolnick, supra, note 58 at 38-43,60-61.
238. In terms of the statutory guidelines enumerated in the Ontario Children's Law Reform Act, this
presumption finds support in sections 24(2)(a) and 24(2)(c).
239. Jeffery Wilson, "Possession is Power: 'Bonding' as Nine-Tenths of the Law" (1987), Canadian Bar
Association-Ontario, 1987 Annual Institute on Continuing Legal Education, at 23.
240. (1973), 12 R.F.L. 280 (Ont. C.A.).
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biological mother, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision on the grounds thatthe
child might suffer "serious harm" if removed from her surroundings and placed "in
the custody and care of someone who would now likely be quite a stranger to her."241
First declared in a dispute between natural and social parents, and subsequently
confirmed in this same context by the Supreme Court of Canada,242 the status quo
presumption is also widely applied in custody disputes between divorced or separated
couples.P" As early as 1971, for example, a survey of Ontario Supreme Court judges
revealed a strong reluctance to disturb the status quo, particularly where the child had
been living with one parent for six months or more.244 More recently, a New Brunswick
court declared it to be "established law" that
.. , where the children haveresidedwithone parent sincethe separation, duringwhich
time their situationhas stabilized, courtswill normally seekto avoiddisruption for the
children.245
Consequently, as James McLeod has explained, provisional custody arrangements
have a considerable impact upon the fmal disposition of most custody disputes, since
continuous residence "in a stable and satisfactory environment creates the status
quO.,,246
While this judicially created presumption clearly provides much greater certainty
than do the current statutory guidelines, it is not without its defects. 247 First, the rule
creates powerful incentives for adults with some relationship with the child to engage
in strategic behaviour directed at establishing a stronger custody claim based on the
child's existing residence. As more than one critic has pointed out,248 this effect
contradicts the welfare of children as a whole by discouraging parents from adopting
interim custody arrangements solely on the basis of the best interests of their children,
by encouraging the abduction of children by separating parents, and by deterring
parents from leaving children in the temporary care of third parties while they
endeavour to resolve emotional or economic difficulties.
241. Ibid. at 288.
242. See, e.g., Racine v. Woods (1984),36 R.F.L. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.); and King v. Low (185), 44 R.F.L.
(2d) 113 (S.C.C.).
243. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Lawrence (1975), 13 N.B.R. (2d) 637 at 639 (Q.B.); McPherson v.
McPherson (1982), 31 R.F.L. (2d) 380 at 383 (Sask. Q.B.); B. v. B., Ont. D.C., No. 7629/82,
6th December 1982, [1983] W.D.F.L. 055 at 6; Sherrett v. Sherrett (1987),6 R.F.L. (3d) 172
(Ont. C.A.); Sickmann v. Sickmann (1988), 15 R.F.L. (3d) 307 (Alta. Q.B.).
244. Adrian Bradbrook, "An Empirical Study of the Attitude of Judges of the Supreme Court of Ontario
Regarding the Workings of the Present Child Custody Adjudication Laws" (1971), 49 Can. Bar
Rev. 557 at 565-66.
245. Doucette v. Bourque (1983), 44 N.B.R. (2d) 441 at 443 (Q.B.), per Logan J.
246. James McLeod, "Annotation" to Davis v. Davis (1986),3 R.F.L. (3d) 30 (Man. Q.B.).
247. For the purposes of the analysis in this section we do not consider the numerous criticisms levelled
against the more general sole custody presumption, however determined. Nevertheless, see infra,
notes 323-365 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., Wilson, supra, note 239 at 3; and Jon Elster, "Solornonic Judgments: Against the Best
Interests of the Child" (1987), 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. I at 21-22.
· Child Custody 911
Second, notwithstanding its improvement upon the existing statutory guidelines,
three factors limit the extent to which the status quo presumption is able to guarantee
determinate outcomes to custody disputes. To begin with, as Bradbrook's survey of
Ontario judges revealed, residency does not establish the status quo unless it persists
unaltered for a considerable period of time (roughly six months). Thus, where the
issue comes to trial shortly after the parents have separated, or where physical custody
has been shared in the interim, the presumption does not supply a determinate answer.
Similarly, the presumption carries considerably less weight where the child has lived
with one parent but the other has maintained regular contact since the separation.
Finally, and above all, the status quo alone is not conclusive, butis itself subject to the
additional proviso that this residential arrangement provide the child with "a stable
and satisfactory environment." As the Prince Edward Island Court of Appeal
emphasized in the recent case of Mooney v. Mooney:249
The trial judge, on a custody application, must consider many factors in order to arrive at
the situation which will be in the best interests of the children. The present custodial
situation is one of these factors and one which is given considerable weight but not one
that can be considered in isolation to many other factors. 250
Thus, the courts continue to retain substantial discretion to evaluate the specific
details of alternative custody arrangements.
Judicial Discretion and Family Autonomy
Above all, by leaving to the court the discretion to evaluate the "stability" of the
family unit in which the child shall live, the status quo presumption continues to
accord considerable authority to the presiding judge to determine the values by which
the "best interests of the child" are to be ascertained. In this respect, contemporary
custody decisions invariably violate fundamental principles offamily autonomy both
in the process by which they are reached, and in the specific outcomes themselves.
The current process of custody litigation challenges family autonomy both by the
questions that the best interests test deems relevant to the outcome, and by the
methods by which the courts endeavour to answer these questions. As already
explained, the welfare principle involves "person-oriented" determinations which
compel the court to engage in detailed scrutiny of the personal lives of the claimants,
necessitating a more inquisitorial approach than traditional "act-oriented" adjudica-
tion, and rationalizing the use of psychological assessments to aid the court in its
decision.P! Indeed, the best interests standard encourages the parents themselves to
249. (1988), 15 R.F.L. (3d) 347 (p.E.I.C.A.).
250. Ibid. at 350. See also R. v. R., supra, note 219 at 283-84 (status quo arrangements more important
on applications for interim custody order than final disposition where "the parties cannot ... be
treated as having somehow waived the right to put a different proposal"); Brown v. Brown (1986),
2 R.F.L. (3d) 173 (p.E.I.C.A.) (judge must weigh alternative arrangements to determine best
interests overall).
251. See supra, notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
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emphasize the other's failings both as a parent and as a person.252 Once the initial
decision is made to resort to the court, control of the process is taken away from the .
family members themselves and invested in the authority of the court. At this point,
the extent to which the process respects the autonomy and integrity of the parties
involved is entirely at the discretion of the presiding judge. While many undoubtedly
exercise this discretion with sensitivity and care, the very possibility of bias and abuse
is a matter for considerable concern.P"
Of course, the process of any adjudicative exercise is merely the prelude to its
outcome. Here too, however, judicial applications of the best interests test have
consistently proven destructive of family autonomy. In 1983, for example, the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal upheld a decision in which the mother was awarded
sole custody in part because the trial judge considered the father's religious beliefs to
be contrary to the best interests of the three children.P" Responding to the father's
claim that the ruling had infringed his Charter rights to "freedom of conscience and
religion,"255 the Court merely declared that:
[the trial judge] was required to consider the effect on the welfare of the children of the
religious beliefs and practices of the [father] and in so doing he did not contravene either
the Bill ofRights or the Constitution Act, 1982. 256
Similarly, broad statutory provisions requiring the court to consider proposed plans
"for the care and upbringing of the child,"257 the "permanence and stability of the
family unit" proposed for the child,258 and the "ability and willingness" of each
claimant "to provide the child with guidance and education, the necessaries oflife and
any special needs of the child,,259 disregard parental autonomy to determine the
norms and structures of their own family relationships (above a minimum standard
established by child welfare legislation). As a result, in deciding the outcomes of
specific custody disputes, courts repeatedly consider the financial status of each
parenf60 (a factor that almost always works to the disadvantage of mothers), and
judges inevitably apply their own conceptions of appropriate family values and
methods of childrearing. Given the current composition of the Canadian judiciary,
252. This is particularly true in light of the sole custody presumption which fashions a winner-loser
result.
253. See, e.g., Phylis Chesler, Mothers on Trial: The Battle For Children and Custody (Seattle: The
Seal Press, 1986); Susan Boyd," Child Custody and Working Mothers," in Sheila L. Martin
and Kathleen E. Mahoney, eds., Equality and Judicial Neutrality, (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at
172-73.
254. Brown v. Brown (1983), 3 D.L.R. (4th) 283 (Sask. C.A.) [hereinafter Brown].
255. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982, s. 2(a).
256. Brown, supra, note 254 at 289.
257. CLRA, s. 24(2)(e).
258. Ibid. s. 24(2)(f).
259. Ibid. s. 24(2)(d).
260. See, e.g., Fullerton v. Richman (1983), 40 O.R. (2d) 395.
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the consistent articulation of traditional assumptions regarding the proper form of
family life should come as no surprise.
Thus, for example, despite the express abolition of matrimonial fault as a basis for
deciding custody, judges continue to withhold custody on the basis of the claimant's
adultery. This result is often achieved by the court's assessment that the adultery
reflects a willingness to place selfish interests above those of the child.261 More
generally, one recent Ontario decision goes so far as to suggest that the parent who
seeks a divorce ought by that reason alone to be denied custody. 262 In awarding sole
custody to the father, Misener D.C.J. observed that
[the mother] was quite prepared - and I think that she consciously thought about it - to
deprive the children of the benefit of the constant presence of a good father, of at least a
good husband, if not a totally satisfactory one, and of a reasonably harmonious family
relationship for no other reason than to fmd more excitement in life. 263
Similarly, a number of courts have looked harshly upon custody claimants who enter
into relationships of unmarried cohabitation following separation.P'' In 1979, for
example, one Ontario judge awarded sole custody to the father on the grounds that it
was not in the child's best interest to be exposed to such an environment.r'f As
McNab Co. Ct. J. explained:
One is immediately faced with the fact that what the wife proposed to do is to bring the
children into a home where she and her paramour are living in adultery. The courts, in
many cases, have expounded on the adverse effects on children of such an arrangement.
It therefore seems unnecessary to say that it is not in the best interests of the children to be
taken from a respectable home and exposed to that, unless there are other factors that
would warrant the court doing SO.266
More recently, the British Columbia Court ofAppeal upheld a trial decision granting
custody ofa four-year-old girl to the father in part because the mother "had engaged in
a series of common law relationships. "267 As McLachlin J .A. (as she then was) wrote
for the Court: "The court must be concerned with the future stability of the home in
261. See, e.g., Nielson v. Nielson (1971), 5 R.F.L. 313 (Ont. H.C.); Bosch v. Bosch (1985), 49 R.F.L.
(2d) 157 (Sask. Q.B.) [hereinafter Bosch]; Stephens v. Stephens (1986),4 R.F.L. (3d) 200
(B.C.S.C.).
262. Fishback v. Fishback (1985), 46 R.F.L. (2d) 44 (Ont. Dist. Ct.).
263. Ibid. at 49 per Misener D.C.I. The Fishback decision also represents a classic example of how the
process of contemporary custody determinations, as well as their substantive outcomes,
infringe basic values of family autonomy.
264. See, e.g., Friday v. Friday (1975), 20 R.F.L. 202 (Sask. Q.B.); Veighey v . Veighey (1977),3
R.F.L. (2d) 148 (Ont. Div. Ct.).
265. Gilbert v. Gilbert (1979), 10 R.F.L. (2d) 385 (Ont. Co. Ct.)
266. Ibid. at 389.
267. Bell v. Kirk (1986),3 R.F.L. (3d) 377 at 380 (B.C.C.A.).
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which the child is placed."268 Similarly, in Klachevsky v. Brown,269 the Manitoba
Court of Appeal overturned a lower court decision awarding sole physical custody to
the father partly on the grounds that he had been involved with three women since the
marriage (the third of whom he had married),270 According to O'Sullivan I.A.
(Huband I.A. concurring):
[T]he [trial] judge fell into error in failing to take into account the father's record of
instability in his home life comparedwith [the mother's] stability.I"
So too, several courts have displayed a strong aversion to child care provided outside
the home. In R. v. R., 272 the Alberta Court ofAppeal upheld a trial decision awarding
sole custody to the father because work on the family farm allowed him to spend more
time with the four-year-old daughter than did the mother's employment. Noting that
the paternal grandmother was "available for housekeeping and babysitting chores"
when the father was engrossed by "peak work periods," the trial judge had declared
that:
If the fatherhas custodyof the child, it is apparentthattherewillbe muchlessneedfor a
delegationto others of the daily care and upbringingof the child.273
In this evaluation, the Court of Appeal was unable to find any manifest error.274
Similarly, in Klachefsky v. Brown,275 a Manitoba trial court granted custody to the
remarried father since "the new Mrs. Klachefsky will be available to the children 24
hours a day" so that there was no need to rely on "daycare or other hired child
caretakers. ,,276 In this case, however, the Manitoba Court ofAppeal reversed the trial
judge, concluding that he had committed a "palpable error" in placing "undue
emphasis" on the mother's need for "paid assistance to provide care for her
children. ,,277
268. Ibid.
269. (1988), 12 R.F.L. (3d) 280 (Man. C.A.) [hereinafter Klachevsky],
270. A second issue involved the trial judge's emphasis on "the fact that the mother might have to rely
on paid daycare for two hours a day while she looks after the children in Vancouver." Ibid. at
284. This aspect of the case is examined at infra, .notes 275-277 and accompanying text.
271. Ibid.
272. Supra, note 219.
273. Cited in ibid. at 28 I.
274. Ibid.
275. (1987), 9 R.F.L. (3d) 428 (Man. Q.B.).
276. Ibid. at 432.
277. Klachefsky, supra, note 269 at 282. On the other hand, even here, O'Sullivan l.A. (Huband l.A.
concurring) was careful to point out (at 282-83) that "there is available to the mother extended
family in Vancouver," and: "The younger child is now enrolled in kindergarten where he spends
part of the day. Another portion of the day is spent in a daycare facility, until he graduates to
Grade I in six months' time. Both children will be returning home from school around 3:30 p.rn.
but the mother does not arrive home from work until around 5:30 p.m. She has made arrange-
ments for a competent person to be at the home from 3:00 o'clock on until the mother's arrival."
One wonders whether the result would have been the same had the children been younger and
paid child care required for more than two hours each day for the older child and somewhat longer
for the younger (but with only six months remaining before beginning Grade 1).
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Finally, homosexual claimants present particularly easy targets for the bigoted
judge.278 In 1974, for example, a Saskatchewan court denied custody to a lesbian
mother on the grounds that "if these children are raised by their mother they will be
too much in contact with people of abnormal tastes and proclivities.t'-"? While more
recent decisions do not as a general rule consider homosexuality a complete bar to
custody, they nonetheless consider it a relevant factor for consideration.P" In this
respect, several courts have speculated on the alleged dangers of granting custody or
access to an openly homosexual parent: the possibility that the child will experience
social stigma,281 the risk of psychological damage,282 and above all the long-
standing homophobic anxiety that homosexual parents will indoctrinate their children
into becoming homosexuals themselves. 283
In one recent Ontario case, for example, while Nasmith Fam. Ct. J. awarded
custody of the Ifl-year-old daughter to herIesbian mother, he was careful to point out
that the mother was "not militant," did "not flaunt her homosexuality," did not engage
in "overt sexual contact" with her partner, and was not "biased about [her daughter's]
sexual orientation" but instead appeared "to assume that [she would] be heterosex-
ual. ,,284 Similarly, a recent Saskatchewan ruling denied overnight access to a
non-custodial father so long as he continued to live with his male lover. 285 Most tragic
is the case of BezaireP" Here, the trial judge had granted custody to the lesbian
mother, with the condition that "no other person shall reside with Mrs. Bezaire
without the approval of the judge.,,287 When the mother disregarded this proviso, the
father obtained an order from the same judge transferring custody to him. On appeal,
the Ontario Court of Appeal emphasized that homosexuality itself does not preclude
custody but, nevertheless, Wilson I.A. (as she then was) dissenting, refused to
question the propriety of the conditional order, treated its violation by the mother as
evidence of her psychological unfitness, and upheld the trial judgment.P" Several
months later, as Wendy Gross relates, the mother took the children and left for the
United States, where she remained until 1985 when she voluntarily surrendered
herself to the police in Windsor to stand trial on six counts of abduction and
harbouring.P?
Contemporary child welfare legislation does not remove children from the custody
278. See generally Wendy Gross, "Judging the Best Interests of the Child: Child Custody and the
Homosexual Parent" (1986), 1 C.J.W.L. 505.
279. Case v. Case (1974), 18 R.F.L. 132 at 138 (Sask. Q.B.).
280. Bezaire v. Bezaire (1980), 20 R.F.L. (2d) 358 (Ont, C.A.) [hereinafter Bezaire].
281. For an excellent treatment of this issue, see Gross, supra, note 278 at 514-20.
282. Ibid. at 509-12.
283. Ibid. at 520-23. Even if this manifestly false allegation was true, to deny custody to a homosexual
parent on this basis would clearly contradict principles of family autonomy. Why should sexual
orientation be treated any differently than minority religious views?
284. Re Barkley and Barkley (1980), 28 O.R.(2d) 136 (Prov. Ct.).
285. Worby v . Worby (1985), 48 R.F.L. (2d) 369 (Sask. Q.B.).
286. Supra, note 280.
287. Cited in ibid. at 361.
288. Ibid. at 365.
289. Gross, supra, note 278 at 527.
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of their parents where the parents have extra-marital sex, where they are unmarried,
where they both work and rely upon paid child care outside the home, nor indeed
where they are homosexuals. Nor do Canadian courts declare children "in need of
protection" because of the financial status of the family, because the "family unit" is
neither "permanent" nor "stable," because a judge happens to disagree with parental
plans for "the care and upbringing of the child," nor because the parents happen to
hold minority religious beliefs. In all these circumstances, Canadian law recognizes
the autonomy of the family members themselves to determine their own collective
existence. Under the best interests test, on the other hand, contemporary custody law
may make any or all of these considerations relevant to the outcome of any given'
custody dispute. In so doing, the law disregards fundamental values of individual and
family autonomy.
Substantive Custody Reform
While some evaluations of contemporary custody law criticize the present regime for
contradicting the principles of gender equality and family autonomy that inform the
new family law, most recommendations for the substantive modification of custody
rules emphasize the many ways in which the current system consistently fails to
advancethe welfare of children as a whole. Nevertheless, the two leading reform
proposalsP'l-for a judicially devised primary caregiver presumption and for a
statutory presumption recommending joint custody-are typically rationalized in
terms ofchildren's best interests (welfare considerations) and according to a vision of
justice associated with the central principles of the new family law (considerations of
justice). In this respect, each alternative reflects both child protection and private
dispute-settlement rationales for deciding custody disputes.
This section evaluates both presumptions by examining the two sets of justifica-
tions - welfare-oriented and justice-based - advanced in favour ofeach. Specifically,
we conclude, while both rules promise distinct improvements upon the capacity of the
current system to further the welfare of children as a whole.??' a joint custody
presumption may offer additional benefits that are absent in a regime favouring sole
custody by primary caregivers.P'' On the other hand, the evidence upon which this
highly tentative conclusion is based is extremely uncertain.F" Regardless, in neither
290. We ignore for purposes of this discussion proposals to restore the maternal presumption or to
introduce a "same sex" presumption, that would place female children with their mothers and
male children with their fathers. For a defence of the former approach, see Uviller, supra, note
234. For an assertion of the latter view, see John Santrock and Richard Warshak, "Father
Custody and Social Development in Boys and Girls" (Fall 1979), J. Soc, Issues 112. For an
analysis of both approaches and a highly tentative recommendation for the latter "same sex"
rule, see Chambers, supra, note 53 at 512-13,515-27,559-60. In each case, these rules contradict
principles of gender neutrality in the new family law by replicating existing patterns of gender
socialization.
291. Infra, notes 315, 385, 398 and accompanying text.
292. Infra, notes 323-354, 385 and accompanying text.
293. Infra, notes 386-397 and accompanying text.
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case is the burden of justification met that parental inability to agree on post-
separation custody arrangments necessarily places children at risk and in need of
protection.P" Consequently, unless parental separation itself is to be treated as
pathological and families are to be identified solely with pre-separation configura-
tions, family autonomy requires that custody law emphasize the function of private
dispute-settlement rather than that of child protection.
From the perspective of private dispute-resolution, however, the highly contextual
and relational character of justice within the family context makes it impossible to
support either the primary caregiver or the joint custody reform. First, to the extent
that both approaches are conceived as mere presumptions for determining the best
interests of the child, they remain wedded to a conception of custody law in which the
function of child protection is paramount. As a result, they continue to allow varying
degrees of judicial discretion, thereby preserving the indeterminacy of the current
regime and the corresponding authority of the courts to introduce alien norms into the
resolution of intra-familial disputes. 295 Second, by imposing a monolithic structure
on post-separation family forms, each alternative disregards the autonomy of family
members themselves to determine the patterns of their own collective existence.
Thus, although the primary caregiver approach at least looks to the context of family
relationships to select the custodial parent, it forces post-separation custody
arrangements into a rigid framework of sole custody. In so doing, it disregards the
complex web of human relationships that constitute each actual family, and
contradicts the contextual and relational conception of justice that we believe is
essential to the fair solution of concrete custody disputes.F" So too, contemporary
joint custody legislation envisions an inflexible model of pure shared custody, in
which each parent holds an equal right to decisions regarding the child's upbringing
and children spend equal time with each parent. Here, family context and real
relationships are ignored entirely so that children qua property may be equally divided
between separating parents qua abstract rights-bearers.P?
Consequently, while joint custody and the primary caregiver principle each
embody a vision of justice, in each case these visions are sadly incomplete.
Nevertheless, to the extent that both anticipate a more comprehensive notion of
justice in the context of custody disputes, they merit careful examination.
PRIMARY CAREGIVER PRESUMPTION
The primary caregiver presumption is of particularly recent judicial creation. First
enunciated by the Supreme Court of West Virginia in the 1981 case of Garska v.
McCoy,298 the rule has since been adopted by the Supreme Court of Minnesota.F"
294. Infra, notes 323-325, 327-330 and accompanying text.
295. Infra, notes 316-322, 383-384 and accompanying text.
296. Infra, notes 355-365 and accompanying text.
297. Infra, notes 399-414 and accompanying text.
298. 278 S.E.2d 357 CW. Va. 1981) [hereinafter Garska].
299. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1985) [hereinafter Pikula].
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and has been employed somewhat less emphatically by courts in Oregon, California
and Pennsylvania.F'' and in at least four recent Canadian decisions.P'" As stated by
the Chief Justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, the presumption
establishes "an explicit and almost absolute preference" for sale custody by the parent
who:
(1) prepares the meals; (2) changes the diapers and dresses and bathes the child; (3)
chauffers the child to school, church, friends' homes and the like; (4) provides medical
attention, monitors the child's health, and is responsible for taking the child to the
doctor; and (5) interacts with the child's friends, school authorities, and other parents
engaged in activities that involve the child.302
Once selected, the custodial parent becomes "primarily responsible for making
decisions concerning the child and for providing the child's permanent home.,,303
The non-custodial parent, on the other hand, is typically granted "liberal visitation /
rights, including the right to have the child during holidays, part of the summer, and
some weekends.Y'?"
Among adherents, the rule has been justified on procedural and substantive
grounds, for which the immediate objectives are further rationalized according to
both welfare-oriented and justice-based considerations. First, procedurally, the
strength of the presumption increases the extent to which the outcomes of most
custody actions may be predicted in advance.F" On welfare principles, this certainty
reduces the likelihood of disputes going to trial,306 thereby protecting children as a
whole from the possibility of injury from potentially bitter, costly, and protracted
custody litigation. 307 From the perspective of justice, this approach advances gender
equality both in the gender-neutral form of the rule itself,308 and in the marked
tendency of a more determinate standard to lessen the opportunities for fathers to
300. Marcia O'Kelly, "Blessing the Tie that Binds: Preference for the Primary Caretaker as Custodian"
(1988),63 N. Dak. L. Rev. 481 at 514-16.
301. Grills, supra, note 208 at 394; Bosch v. Bosch supra, note 261; Menage v . Hedges (1986),
8 R.F.L. (3d) 225 at 238-41 (ant. U.F.C.); Harden v. Harden (1987), 6 R.F.L. (3d) 147 at
151 (Sask. C.A.).
302. Richard Neely, "The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule:Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed"
(1985),3 Yale L. & pory Rev. 168 at 180.
303. Ibid. at 182.
304. Ibid.
305. Ibid. at 181-82. See also Martha Fineman, "Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and
Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking" (1988), Harv. L. Rev. 727 at 772.
306. See, e.g., Mnookin, supra, note I at 262; and Elster, supra, note 248 at 24.
307. Garska, supra, note 298 at 361.
308. This feature of the role has been emphasized by several proponents. See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff,
"Gender and Child-Custody Determinations: Exploding the Myths" in Irene Diamond, ed.,
Families, Politics and Public Policy: A Feminist Dialogue on Women and the State, (New York:
Longman, 1983) at 196; Neely, supra, note 302 at 180; Sheila M. Holmes, "Imposed Joint
Legal Custody: Children's Interests or Parental Rights?" (1987), 45 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 300 at
321-23.
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threaten legal action as a means of extracting out-of-court concessions from primary
caregiving mothers.309
Second, substantively, the presumption ensures that custody will generally be
granted to the parent who has devoted more time and energy to the care of the children
than has the other parent. In the interests of children, this result attempts to place
children with the parent whose past caregiving role is assumed to establish a reliable
basis for predicting future superiority as a parent.P? preserves the close emotional
bonds between children and primary caregiving adults, 311 and protects children in
general from the risk of psychological or material harm said to result from
arrangements of shared physical custody''P and court-ordered joint legal custody. 313
In terms of substantive fairness, more than one commentator has justified sole
custody to the primary caregiver as "a reward for past caretaking behavior."314
Procedural Basis
On procedural grounds alone, there appears to be little to oppose in the primary
caregiver rule. Notwithstanding the promulgation of statutory guidelines and the
emergence of a judicially created status quo presumption, the imprecision of the
prevailing best interests test undoubtedly contributes to the frequency and duration of
custody litigation and to the unequal bargaining position of separated and divorced
mothers. As a gender-neutral means of increasing the determinacy of custody
determinations, therefore, a strong primary caregiver presumption represents a
noticeable improvement upon the current regime. In addition to the benefits it confers
on the process of litigation and out-of-court bargaining, by confining the scope of
judicial discretion, such an approach should also reduce the potential for judges to
resolve custody disputes on the basis of alien values concerning appropriate methods
of childrearing and family life generally. 315
Nevertheless, these advantages of determinacy and judicial restraint should not be
overstated. First, the presumption fails to provide a clear result where both parents
have shared child care (either concurrently or for different periods of time) on a
relatively equal basis. It is not enough merely to suggest that such cases will be
infrequent given current childrearing pattems.I'? nor that parents will invariably
agree wherever both have functioned as true "primary caregivers.t'P'? Where the
parents have shared caregiving responsibilities and where they are not able to agree
upon post-separation custody arrangements, a decision must be reached. On these
309. Garska, supra, note 298 at 362.
310. Ibid. at 364.
311. See, e.g., Pikula, supra, note 299 at 711.
312. See, e.g., Neely, supra, note 302 at 183.
313. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra, note 33 at 55; Neely, supra, note 302 at 183.
314. Fineman, supra, note 305 at 771. See also Polikoff, supra, note 308 at 196.
315. See, e.g., Neely, supra, note 302 at 181; and Boyd, supra, note 13 at 30.
316. See, e.g., Neely, supra, note 302 at 180.
317. See, e.g., Fineman, supra, note 305 at 773.
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occasions, it seems, the court is left only with the costly, lengthy, and invasive
approach of individualized "person-oriented" determinations in "the best interests of
the child. ,,318
Second, to the extent that the primary caregiver principle operates as a mere
presumption with respect to the actual custody arrangement that best serves the
interests of the child, the court retains ultimate discretion to overlook the rule where
its own conception of the child's best interests dictates an alternative outcome. While
the Garska decision established an especially strong presumption, rebuttable only
upon a demonstration of parental unfitness or in accordance with the wishes of older .
children, others favour weaker presumptions that would leave significantly greater
discretion in the hands of the presiding judge.3 19 Moreover, even where the
jurisdiction adopts a strong presumption, the court may embrace an expansive
definition ofprimary caregiving, or of parental unfitness, in order to achieve a desired
result.F? Regardless of its [mal form, therefore, the primary caregiver approach
retains a considerable measure of indeterminacy and thus fails to eliminate the
existing judicial discretion to apply alien norms and values in the resolution of
custody disputes.
Third, a simple preference for the primary caregiver runs into problems where the
children reside with the secondary caregiver following separation. Should the rule
apply only to pre-separation child care arrangements, or also to those adopted in the
post-separation period? To the extent that the presumption is rationalized as a means
of ensuring continuous care by the child's "psychological parent" the latter approach
would appear to be preferable.V' On the other hand, where primary caregiving is
viewed as presumptive evidence of future parenting ability, an emphasis upon
pre-separation child care responsibilities may be more desirable. Similarly, since
judicial consideration ofpost-separation arrangements introduces the same incentives
for strategic behaviour on the part of parents as does the status quo presumption, the
interests of children as a whole seem to favour the former approach. So too, where the
rule is viewed primarily as a means of furthering women's autonomy to freely
terminate bonds ofmarriage or cohabitation, and to bargain fairly for economic rights
of support and property division, a rule that diminishes the significance of
post-separation events is undoubtedly superior. 322 On the other hand, where justice is
conceived as a "reward" for past caregiving activity, it would presumably be wrong to
consider only nurturing carried out prior to separation. Thus, since the numerous
rationales for the rule fail to indicate a conclusive approach, the court retains
considerable latitude to apply both primary caregiving and status quo presumptions in
318. According to Richard Neely, the West Virginia courts, when faced with such a scenario, "hold
hearings to determine which parent would be the better single parent." Neely, supra, note 302
at 180.
319. See, e.g., O'Kelly, supra, note 300 at 534-37.
320. Ibid. at 534.
321. Ibid. at 542-44.
322. See, e.g., Boyd, supra, note 13 at 38-39.
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selecting the custodial parent. Again, therefore, the primary caregiver rule is both less
determinate and more discretionary than initially assumed.
Substantive Basis
It is the substantive basis of the primary caregiver presumption that is cause for our
greatest concern. While past parenting experience, close emotional bonds, and above
all justice in the context of family disputes all demand special recognition of primary
caregiving relationships in post-separation custody arrangements, contemporary
versions of the primary caregiver approach remain fmnly committed to a traditional
image of the natural family as a private sphere insulated from legal regulation, in
which one person is primarily responsible for the care of children, where parental
authority must be absolute, and where children can in their own best interests tolerate
only one "psychological parent." In this respect, our objection to the primary
caregiver rule is not a criticism of its effort to contextualize the custody decision, but
instead of its rigid adherence to a traditional model of sole custody (albeit with liberal
access to the non-custodial parent).
Welfare Considerations While the principal reason for this sole custody presump-
tion is the belief, associated with the work of Goldstein, Solnit and Freud, that
children risk psychological harm where parental authority is shared among two or
more persons and subject to regulation by law,323 surprisingly little evidence has been
adduced to support this assertion.F" On the contrary;much contemporary psycho-
logical theory calls into question children's assumed needs for an isolated and
authoritarian nurturing environment. 325 So too, a growing body of research has
begun to document the many ways in which children's welfare is actually endangered
by orders for sole custody. 326
With respect to the allegedly "universal" requirement for "direct, intimate, and
continuous care" of children by autonomous parents, cross-cultural research reveals
this assumption itself as little more than a reflection of traditional patterns of
childrearing characteristic of modem industrial societies. Specifically, while
Goldstein et. al. abandon the gender bias of earlier maternal attachment theories, they
retain as "natural" and necessary to children's developmental needs the culturally
specific institution of the private family secluded from regulation by law. Conse-
quently, inasmuch as the sole custody presumption is predicated on theories of
323. Supra, notes 159-166 and accompanying lext.
324. The absence of empirical evidence for these conclusions has been noled by more than one critic.
See, e.g., Schwartz, supra, nole 53 at 230-31; Judith Ryan, "Joint Cuslody in Canada: Time
for a Second Look" (1986), 49 R.F.L. (2d) 119 at 131.
325. For a brief overview of this research, see Roche, supra, note 58 at 15-20.
326. See, e.g., Mavis Hetherington, Martha Cox and Roger Cox, "Effects of Divorce on Parents and
Children", in M.E. Lamb, ed., Nontraditional Families: Parenting and Child Development,
(New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1982) 233; Judith S. Wallerstein, and Joan B. Kelly, Surviving
the Breakup: How Children and Parents Cope with Divorce, (New York: Basic Books, 1980).
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children's needs for autonomous parents, the rule merely replicates the structure of
childrearing associated with this thoroughly contingent mode of family life. What is
more, to the extent that the primary caregiver approach presupposes that children are
able to develop emotional attachments to only one parent, this presumption reinforces
the still pervasive ideas that children require a single "psychological parent" so that
one adult alone must be primarily responsible for the care of each child.327
Contemporary psychological analysis not only questions traditional assumptions
regarding children's capacities for emotional bonding and their needs for autonomous
parents, but suggests that this emphasis on family privacy may actually be detrimental
to their best interests. Thus, for example, two prominent developmental psycholo-
gists report that "morally mature and independent judgment and behavior are
facilitated by a pluralistic, as opposed to a monolithic, or anomie, socio-
psychological human ecology. ,,328 Other commentators emphasize that social
isolation and abolute parental authority intensify dependency and delay socio-
psychological maturation.P? Thus, as another researcher concludes:
[The] assumption of children's need for autonomous parents lacks any clear empirical
base and may be effectively refuted by research suggesting psychological harm of
overemphasis on privacy and parental autonomy in childrearing practices.P''
In the context of custody disputes, these findings challenge the child protection
justification for a presumption of sole custody. If children are not invariably harmed
by the absence of absolute parental authority, court orders for joint legal or physical
custody need not necessarily contradict children's best interests. Instead, as several
recent studies have discovered, children's welfare may actually be threatened by a
sole custody presumption.
First, even where one parent (usually the mother) fulfills the majority of
childrearing responsibilities, evidence indicates that children nonetheless develop
strong emotional bonds with secondary caregiving parents (typically fathers),331 as
well as with other adults who comprise the child's "extended family" of grandparents,
relatives and friends. 332 Sole custody to the primary caregiver severs these bonds
between the child and the secondary caregiver (as well as with the "extended family"
associated with this focal relationship) by granting ultimate decision-making
327. See, e.g., Fran Olsen, "The Politics of Family Law" (1984), 2 Law and Inequality I at 19; and
Katherine T. Bartlett and Carol B. Stack, "Joint Custody, Feminism and the Dependency
Dilemma" (1986),2 Berkeley Women's L. 1. 9 at 32.
328. James Garbarino and Urie Bronfenbrenner, "The Socialization of Moral Judgment and Behavior in
Cross-Cultural Perspective," in Thomas Lickona, ed., Moral Development and Behaviour:
Theory, Research and Social Issues, (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1976) 80.
329. See, e.g., Roche, supra, note 58 at 17.
330. Gary B. Melton, Child Advocacy: Psychological Issues and Interventions, (New York: Plenum,
1983) at 5-6.
331. See, e.g., Chambers, supra, note 53 at 533-38.
332. See, e.g., H. Jay Folberg and Marva Graham, "Joint Custody of Children Following Divorce"
(1979), 12 D.C. Davis L. Rev. 523 at 565.
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authority and immediate physicial care to the former, leaving the latter only with
"residual rights" of access and guerdianship.F" Although recent legal developments
suggest both a greater willingness to enforce access orders334 and a more expansive
interpretation of guardianship rights,335 there is little doubt as to the message
conveyed by a court order for sole custody: the custodial parent becomes the "true"
parent, while the non-custodial parent "is relegated to the status of a visiting
relative. "336
Consequently, it is hardly surprising that where custodial parents have threatened
the existence ofcontinuing relationships between their children and the non-custodial
parent, the legal system has been loathe to respond. Despite a noticeable judicial bias
against maternal relocatiorr'f? and a marked judicial tendency to uphold status quo
living arrangements.P" residential changes by custodial parents are not subject to an
explicit standard of reasonableness. 339 Remedies for deliberate obstruction of access
have been virtually nonexistent. 340 Finally, at least one court has suggested that
access can be discontinued where inter-parental conflict generated by the custodial
parent causes emotional anxiety for the child.341 While these cases are thankfully
few, and most custodial parents undoubtedly attempt to accommodate relationships
between their children and the non-custodial parent to the best of their abilities, their
very existence and the various legal reactions reveal the diminished status of the
non-custodial parent in a sole custody arrangement.
The reality of this diminished status is not lost on non-custodial parents
themselves. In fact, as more than one study has reported,342 the sense ofloss that they
experience in being deprived of a meaningful role in their children's lives is so great
that they frequently retreat from these relationships in depression and frustration.
Moreover, the incidence of this phenomenon is so widespread that it dwarfs the small
number of cases in which these relationships are terminated by the deliberate actions
333. Supra, note 167.
334. Supra, note 171.
335. Recent amendments to federal and provincial legislation expressly provide that the entitlement to
access shall include the right "to make inquiries and to be given information as to the health,
education and welfare of the child." DA (1985), s. 16(5); CLRA, s. 20(5).
336. Abella, supra, note 134 at 469.
337. See, e.g., Katherine C. Sheehan, "Post-Divorce Child Custody and Family Relocation" (1986), 9
Harv. Women's L.J. 135.
338. See, e.g., Crawfordv. Crawford (1985), 46 R.F.L. (2d) 331·(p.E.I. S.C.); Smith v. Smith (1987),
7 R.F.L. (3d) 206 (N.B. Fam. Ct.). See also Dorothy Lipovenko, "Child stability more impor-
tant than parental bond, court rules," Globe & Mail (17 March 1989) A3.
339. See, e.g., Wickham v. Wickham, (1983), 35 R.F.L. (2d) 448 (Ont. C.A.); Landrey v. Lavers
(1985), 45 R.F.L. (2d) 235 (Ont. C.A.). This is not to defend the approach of several American
jurisdictions, in which a right of consent to relocation grants an effective veto power to non-
custodial parents, and preserves a status quo that may have been established by an unequal
process of decision-making during cohabitation and/or may no longer reflect a fair arrangement for
physical custody.
340. See, e.g., Frame v. Smith, supra, note 170.
341. Rutherford v. Rutherford (1986), 4 R.F.L. (3d) 457 (B.C.S.C.).
342. See, e.g., Judith Brown Grief, "Access: Legal Right or Privilege at the Custodial Parent's Discre-
tion" (1980), 3 Can. J. Fam. L. 43.
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of the custodial parent. While some have blamed indifferent fathers for this result,343
it would be wrong to identify this effect with fathers alone, and to ignore both the
context in which these decisions to withdraw are made and the role that the legal
system plays in establishing this context. Above all, sole custody effectively
terminates the non-custodial parent's status as a parent, and restricts parent-child
relationships to the artificial structure of mere "visitation. ,,344
While this consequence has obvious implications for the welfare of the non-
custodial parent, of paramount concern under the prevailing best interests test is the
impact of this relational loss upon the child. In this respect, researchers have noted
both emotional and economic injury. With respect to the former, an order for sole
custody has been analogized to the death of the excluded parent. 345 As Jay Folberg
and Marva Graham report, researchers have uniformly found that "the key variable
affecting satisfactory adjustment of children following divorce is the extent of
continuing involvement by both parents in child rearing."346 With respect to the latter
economic injury, studies indicate a significant correlation between the degree of
contact between children and fathers and the extent to which they fulfill child support
obligations.P" While it would clearly amount to legally sanctioned blackmail to
order joint custody solely to address this deficiency, from the perspective of the
welfare of the child, it appears, it would be equally wrong to ignore this factor.
At the same time, as sole custody weakens children's relationships with
non-custodial parents, it increases their dependency on the custodial parent. To the
extent that custodial parents typically experience considerable personal and financial
pressure in the adjustment to single parenting.v" this result can have immediate
adverse consequences for the child. Thus, Judith Wallerstein and Joan Kelly report a
serious deterioration in the relationship between children and custodial mothers in the
first year after divorce.P''? More generally, primary dependence on one parent
increases the child's emotional and economic vulnerability. With respect to the
former, Sheila Schwartz explains:
This can cause overinvolvement in the life of that parent and an exaggerated fear of what
would happen if that parent were also to be "lost." Such a loss could be real as in death or
illness or an imagined loss to a job, dating or remarriage.P''
343. See, e.g., Fineman, supra, note 305 at 759.
344. Folberg and Graham, supra, note 332 at 555-56.
345. Edward J. Rosen, "Joint Custody: In the Best Interests of the Child and Parents" (1978), I R.F.L.
(2d) 116 at 120.
346. Folberg and Graham, supra, note 332 at 535 [emphasis in original].
347. See, e.g., David L. Chambers, Making Fathers Pay: The Enforcement ofChild Support (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1979); and Jessica Pearson and Nancy Thoennes, "Supporting
Children After Divorce: The Influence of Custody on Support Levels and Payments" (1988), 22
Fam. L.Q. 319.
348. This adjustment is particularly difficult where the custodial parent is the primary caregiver and has
either withdrawn from the labour market or sacrificed advancement to fulfill the responsibilities
of primary caregiver. See, e.g., Polikoff, supra, note 308 at 189.
349. Wallerstein and Kelly, supra, note 326 at 108-20.
350. Schwartz, supra, note 53 at 231.
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With respect to the latter economic insecurity, the death or illness of the custodial
parent could be devastating.
Finally, the sole custody presumption works against the interests of children as a
whole by encouraging an adversarial approach to post-separation custody arrange-
ments, in which there are "winners" and "losers," and where one parent experiences
this loss as an especially severe blow. Not only does this increase the antagonism and
indeed the likelihood of custody disputes in general.P! but it also encourages
strategic behaviour on the part of parents to establish a stronger custody claim.352
This, in turn, discourages the selection of interim custody arrangements in the best
interests of the child, and may operate to reward child abduction. Equally troubling,
the "winner-takes-all" approach of the sole custody determination eliminates any
incentive for the parents themselves (with or without the assistance of a mediator) to
develop methods of cooperation and conflict resolution to govern their future
interaction.F" Even in an arrangement of sole custody, to the extent that the
non-custodial parent maintains a relationship with the child, some continued
association with the custodial parent is inevitable. The language and structure of sole
custody, however, create the illusion that parental separation can accomplish a "clean
break" notwithstanding the children. As a result, it is not surprising that researchers
have discovered a significantly higher rate of relitigation among sole custody
arrangements than in joint custody structures and in custody formations arrived at
through mediation.P"
Justice If the welfare justification for a presumption of sole custody to the primary
caregiver cannot be sustained, its defenders are left only with the assertion that the
substantive outcome achieved by such a rule satisfies some criterion of justice in the
context of custody disputes. In this respect, we have seen, such a result has been
characterized as a "reward" for past caregiving behaviour. Ignoring for the moment
the unfortunate proprietorial conception of children that this expression conveys, as a
standard of justice in the family context this approach does have some initial appeal.
Rather than looking beyond the family for external norms of justice (or welfare) to
resolve custody determinations, a primary caregiver rule contextualizes the custody
decision by looking to each parent's relationship with the child to arrive at a fair result
in the context of the specific dispute before the court. Furthermore, it examines
positive contributions for the development of the child, rather than abstract authority
over the child, as the basis for elaborating parental rights to govern the outcomes of
concrete custody disputes. In each respect, it adopts the relational and contextual
approach that we believe is necessary to the just resolution of intra-familial disputes.
351. See, e.g., Folberg and Graham, supra, note 332 at 549.
352. Ibid. at 558-59.
353. Ibid. at 536.
354. See, e.g., F.W.llfeld, Jr., H.Z.llfeld, and J.R. Alexander, "Does joint custody work? A first look
at outcome data of relitigation" (1982), 139 Am. J. Psychiat. 62; Howard H. Irving and
Michael Benjamin, Family Mediation: Theory and Practice ofDispute Resolution, (Toronto:
Carswell, 1987) at 239. On the other hand, these studies tend to be biased to the extent that only
more cooperative parents would select joint custody and/or mediation in the first place.
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Nevertheless, despite this positive beginning, at this very instant of contextualiza-
tion, the primary caregiver approach simultaneously draws back from the complex
web of actual family relationships so that it may isolate one (undoubtedly strong)
relationship (that of the child and the primary caregiver) to the virtual exclusion of all
others. Relationships between the child and the secondary caregiver, and between the
child and anyone else, are momentarily ignored so that the legal system may take firm
hold of this single (most substantial) fibre as the basis for its award of sole custody to
to the primary caregiving parent.
Although this approach is at least understandable (if not defensible) where the law .
assumes that the welfare of the child imposes the constraint that only one relationship
may be adequately preserved, absent such an explicit child protection rationale, it is
difficult to see what principle can explain the decision to exclude any other
relationship from consideration. Martha Fineman, however, advances such a
rationale in the "clean break" philosophy of contemporary legislation governing
marriage breakdown.P" Here, she notes, the legal system attempts to facilitate not
the continuation and rearrangement of spousal relationships, but instead "an end or
termination of a significant interaction":
... a division, distribution, or allocation of things acquired during marriage - an
emancipatory model - and with its "ending," the permission for a "new life" for the
participants and the withdrawal of active legal interference in their relationship.356
Applied to custody determinations, this paradigm necessarily requires an order for
exclusive custody, so that each parent may be released from continued association
with the other and liberated from "active legal interference" in their lives. One
parent-child relationship, therefore, must take precedence over the other. 357 In this
respect, the primary caregiver rule merely supplies the distributive criterion (based on
the instrumental objective of encouraging nurturing and concern for children358) by
which this selection may be made.
While Fineman's account is certainly intriguing, it is hardly convincing. To begin
with, the theory itself cannot account for the persistent legal recognition of access
between the child and the non-custodial parent. In this well-established legal practice,
a principle of relational continuity, rather than that of the "clean break," is clearly
operative. More generally, despite its purported feminism, the distinctly liberal
framework of Fineman's "emancipatory model" fails to appreciate the complex web
of human relationships that constitute the family, and thus in tum fails to comprehend
the intricate character of concrete custody disputes. For Fineman, the only
355. Fineman, supra, note 305.
356. Ibid. at 756.
357. As a result, the clean break approach creates a powerful incentive to exaggerate one set of parent-
child relationships and to deprecate the significance of the other. Notwithstanding the undeni-
ably gendered reality of most contemporary childrearing, this tendency is apparent in the very
language of "primary" and "secondary" caregiving.
358. Fineman, supra, note 305 at 773-74.
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"significant [family] interaction" is that between each parent. Children are viewed not
as independent persons with whom each parent is connected through a distinct set of
personal bonds, but as possessions in whom each parent is entitled to a particular
claim based on their own respective nurturing roles. 359 Finally, since the family itself
is identified solely with the contractual link between the parents, this institution
necessarily disappears once this constitutional union is terminated. All that remains is
to "divide, distribute and allocate" the "things acquired" during the period of
cohabitation: the stocks, the bonds, the furniture, the children.
On the more contextual analysis of the family developed here, children are
conceptualized as persons, not things, with whom both parents individually, as well
as together, develop a series of mutually sustaining and interconnected relationships.
When parents choose to separate, these independent bonds between parents and
children remain, so that separation itself terminates only the spousal connection, but
not the relationships that otherwise constitute the family. While the parents
themselves may resist continued contact with one another, to the extent that each set
of parent-child relationships is to endure, the parents must of necessity maintain some
connection with one another. Thus, to speak of a "clean break" is clearly illusory.
Instead, the primary function360 of the legal system in the context of a custody dispute
is to assist in the process of restructuring the family form so that relational termination
between the spouses may be accommodated to relational continuity between parents
and children.
In this highly contextual exercise it is obviously not enough merely to single out
one relationship (between the child and the primary caregiver) as the only bond
worthy of legal recognition. On the contrary, children's relationships with secondary
caregivers, as well as with third parties such a grandparents and social parents, may
also be deserving oflegal protection. In each case, however, the just solution to a
given custody dispute cannot be sought in rigid categories (whether primary nurturing
or biological connection), but requires a sensitive evaluation of the nature and
intensity of each adult's relationship with the child, and of the child's own capacity
for independent choice.
Above all, it is mistaken to assume that primary caregiving by one parent
necessarily overshadows any bond between the child and the other parent. Although
the secondary caregiver has by definition not developed as close a physical
relationship with the child as has the primary caregiver, his (typically) relationship
with the child may be far from negligible. 361 In a traditional family arrangement, for
359. Despiteher criticism of this proprietary conception of children in arguments for joint custody,
Fineman finds it useful to employ the "property metaphor" to describe the position of children
in custody determinations, and implicitly employs such a conception in conceiving of children as
"rewards." Ibid. at 737,771. ,
360. We speak of this function as "primary" to emphasize that child protection remains an important, but
subsidiary function in specific custody determinations.
361. In this respect, it should be noted, we do not speak in generalizations regarding the relationships of
most secondary caregivers and their children. In the contextual model advanced here, it is the
actual character of the concrete relationship, not an abstract category defined by prevailing societal
patterns, that matters to the analysis.
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example, the mother may have been entirely responsible for cleaning, cooking,
bathing, feeding, and dressing the child, while the father may have chauffeured the
child to school and social activities and taken primary responsibility for the child's
educational and religious upbringing. 362 To grant sole custody to the "primary"
caregiving mother would be both to ignore the important contribution of the father's
"secondary" caregiving and to annul the significant relationship that this interaction
has established between the father and the child. 363
Even where a father has had very little physical association with the child, one
would want to look carefully at the family context to determine the fair solution to a
specific custody dispute. Thus, for example, where the father works on an oil rig so
that he may provide a "better life" for his children and retains a keen interest and
involvement in their upbringing despite his physical separation for extended periods
of time, it would surely be wrong to dismiss the relationship between the children and
this "primary breadwinner" as insignificant or unrelated to the care of the children.
Certainly, an order for "primary residence" to the mother seems justified on these
facts; but to categorically terminate the father's relationship with the children,
reducing him to a mere visitor with no meaningful role in the children's lives, appears
equally unjust to both the father and to the children.
From the perspective of justice, therefore, the primary caregiver rule appears
unacceptably crude. Not only does the rule neglect the legitimate interests of
secondary caregivers to continued relationships with their children, it also ignores the
equally substantial interests of children to continued relationships with secondary
caregivers. So too, to the extent that it disregards children's own wishes, it ignores
their steadily increasing capacity for self-determination. What is more, absent an
existing dispute over a specific aspect of the child's upbringing (e.g. education or
religion), parental separation itself demands no more than a decision on the child's
residential arrangements.P" While the primary caregiver represents the obvious
candidate for the child's primary residence, there is simply no need norjustification to
362. By using the term "responsibility," rather than decision-making authority, we intend that this
function involved more than mere directives to the mother regarding school and religion. On
the contrary, responsibililty suggests an active role with the child and the child's social environ-
ment, taking the child to school, helping with assignments, meeting with the childs' teachers,
worshipping with the child.
363. This, of course, is not to suggest that the father be granted sole or ''ultimate'' decision-making
authority in matters of education and religion for which he was primarily responsible during the
period of cohabitation, nor that past arrangements be frozen into a perpetual status quo. A contex-
tual approach to family justice requires that custody arrangements be flexible so that they may
accommodate changing values and patterns of childrearing. Thus, where the separation is inspired
by or inspires a greater interest on the part of the mother for active participation in the educa-
tional and religious life of the child, this interest should be reasonably accommodated by the father
and the child, taking into account the context in which the original arrangements were estab-
lished and the patterns adopted in the interim. Similarly, where the father seeks greater involve-
ment in the nurturing activities which were formerly her exclusive domain, this desire should
not be categorically dismissed by virtue of the mother's past caregiving nor by the establishment of
a correponding status quo.
364. For similar recommendations that "custody" awards be replaced by "residency" orders, see Abella,
supra, note 134 at 470; Maidment, supra, note 73 at 280; and Ryan, supra, note 324 at 148.
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adopt a rigid rule of sole custody that would effectively terminate the other parent's
status as a parent.365
JOINT CUSTODY
In contrast to the judicial creation of a primary caregiver presumption, the
development of legal rules favouring joint custody on divorce or separation has been
almost entirely legislative. Beginning with California in 1979, most American states
have now adopted some form of joint custody legislation, ranging from mere
recognition of joint custody as a judicial option,366 to statutory presumptions
favouring joint custody where the parents agree,367 to provisions permitting a court to
order joint custody upon the request ofonly one parent,368to legislation making joint
custody the first arrangement considered by the court regardless of any agreement by
the parents,369 and finally to explicit presumptions in favour of joint custody
notwithstanding the views of the parents.370
While no Canadianjurisdiction has enacted a presumption favouring joint custody,
recent amendments to federal and provincial legislation expressly recognize the
possibility of such an order.371More signifIcantly, a private member's Bill (Bill 95)
currently before the Ontario Legislature''P would establish an explicit presumption
that, regardless of the order sought by either parent, "joint custody of the child by both
parents is in the best interests of the child. "373 Where such an order is made, the Bill
continues:
... each parent shall have equal rights and responsibilities with respect to the physical,
365. Of course, child abuse or spousal assault represent independent grounds for termination of parental
rights - grounds which we do not address in this paper, not because we question the prevalence
of such conduct (we don't) but because these cases pose separate issues of criminality and child
protection, from which we wish to distinguish "hard cases" of disputed custody in the absence
of such independent grounds.
366. See, e.g., Alaska Stat., s. 25.20.060(c) (1982); Ind. Code Ann., s. 31-1-11.5-21(f) (West Cum.
Supp. 1984-85); IowaCode Ann., s. 598.21.6 (West 1981); Ky. Rev. Stat., s. 403.270(3)
(1984); Minn. Stat. Ann., s. 518.003, .17 (West Cum. Supp. 1984); N.C. Gen. Stat.,
s. 50-13-2(b) (1976); Or. Rev. Stat., s. 107.105(1)(a) (1977).
367. Cal. Civ. Code, s. 4600.5(a) (West 1983); Conn. Gen Stat. Ann., s. 46b-56a(b) (West 1984);Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann., s. 214 (1981); Miss Code Ann., s. 93-5-24(4) (Supp. 1984).
368. Cal. Civ. Code, ss. 4600, 4600.5 (West 1980); Hawaii Rev. Stat., ss. 571-46, -46.1; Mich. Compo
Laws Ann., s. 722.23(6a) (West Supp. 1984-1985); Miss. Code Ann., s. 93-5-25 (Supp.
1984); Mont. Rev. Code Ann., s. 40-4-222-25 (1983); Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 12, s. 1275.4 (West
Cum. Supp. 1984-1985); Pa. Stat. Ann., s. 1005 (Purdon 1966).
369. Kan. Stat. Ann., s. 60-161O(a)(4)(A) (1983); N.M. Stat. Ann., s. 40-4-9.1(A) (1978).
370. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 146(C) (West Supp. 1984) ("rebuttable presumption that joint custody is in
the best interest of a minor child"); Idaho Code, s. 32-717B(4) (West Supp. 1982) (denial of
joint custody must be based on a "preponderance of the evidence" that it would not be in the best
interest of minor children); Fla. Stat., s. 61.13(2)(6)(2) (1982 Supp.) (shared custody unless
court finds this to be "detrimental to the child").
371. DA (1985), s. 16(4); CLRA, s. 28(a).
372. Bill 95, An Act to Amend the Children's Law Reform Act, 1st Sess., 34 Leg. Ont., 1988 (1st
Reading, February 8, 1988) [hereinafter Bill 95].
373. Ibid., s. 1(1) [proposed CLRA, s. 20(1a)].
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mental, moral and emotional well-being of the child, including the making of decisions
about the child's education, health care and religious training and, where practicable,
the child shall reside with each parent for an equal period of time.374
Thus, the Bill contemplates joint legal (decision-making) and joint physical
(residential) custody as the general rule in all custody disputes.
As with the primary caregiver presumption, both procedural and substantive
reasons are typically advanced for such a joint custody presumption, each of which is
further rationalized in terms of child welfare and justice-based considerations. Thus,
it is argued, a clear preference for shared custody will dramatically reduce incentives
for strategic behaviour by either parent both in attempting to establish a stronger
custody claim and in negotiating custody arrangements "in the shadow of the law. ,,375
As already explained, this procedural determinacy should advance the welfare of
children as a whole by reducing the expected frequency of custody litigation and by
eliminating disincentives to the selection of interim custody arrangeents in the best
interests of the child. So too, aside from the substantivecontent of the presumption.F"
the certainty of its outcome tends to equalize the negotiating process by eliminating
the bargaining advantages otherwise enjoyed by the least risk-averse party. Finally,
to the extent that a clear statutory presumption narrows the scope for judicial
discretion, such a rule enhances individual and family autonomy by minimizing the
opportunity for judges to decide custody disputes according to their own conceptions
of proper childrearing practices or appropriate family life. 377
Substantively, joint custody provides that "parenting responsibilities and privil-
eges" continue despite parental separation or divorce. 378 In the interests of children,
this result is said to ensure the emotional and economic advantages of continued
relationships with both parents,379 to prevent the child's dependency on the otherwise
sole custodial parent, and to encourage parental cooperation both in establishing
post-separation custody arrangements and in handling subsequent association made
necessary by the continuation of parent-child relationships.P? As a principle of
justice, the presumption is said to further gender equality.F" and to preserve what
some consider to be the fundamental rights of each parent to equal custody of their
children. 382
374. Ibid. s. 1(2) [proposed CLRA, s. 20(2a)].
375. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra, note 53 at 243.
376. Of course, relative to a primary caregiver presumption, a joint custody rule tends to disadvantage
women as a whole by depriving them of what might otherwise represent a considerable legal
"endowment": sole custody of the children. See, e.g., Fineman, supra, note 305 at 761.
377. See, e.g. Bartlett and Stack, supra, note 327 at 25-26.
378. Jim Henderson, "Two are better than one," Globe & Mail (10 May 1988) A7.
379. See, e.g. Folberg and Graham, supra, note 332 at 564-65; Wallerstein and Kelly, supra, note 326
at 310.
380. See, e.g. Folberg and Graham, supra, note 332 at 551; Schwartz, supra, note 53 at 227.
381. See, e.g., Bartlett and Stack, supra, note 327 at 32-33.
382. See, e.g., Ellen Canacakos, "Joint Custody as a Fundamental Right," in Folberg, supra, note 33 at




For the very reasons of child welfare, fair bargaining and family autonomy just cited,
an explicit preference for shared custody represents a clear improvement upon the
current method of open-ended custody determinations based on the best interests of
the child. In fact, to the extent that a shared custody rule avoids the difficult task of
choosing between two parents and eliminates any incentive for parents to engage in
post-separation strategic behaviour to establish a status quo claim, joint custody
appears to promise noticeable procedural advantages over a presumption favouring
sole custody to the primary caregiver.
Nevertheless, as with the primary caregiver presumption, the actual magnitude of
these gains remains quite limited so long as the shared custody principle represents a
mere presumption as to the specific custody arrangement which best advances the
welfare of the child. In Bill 95, for example, the statutory presumption is rebuttable
wherever "evidence to the contrary" persuades the court that joint custody would not
be in the best interests of the child. 3 83 In determining these best interests, moreover,
the court is to consider a set of statutory guidelines only slightly different from the
current open-ended criteria.V" Consequently, the proposed reform continues to
admit considerable judicial discretion, thereby frustrating precisely those objectives
of determinacy and judicial restraint that proponents commend as potential
advantages of the presumption.
Substantive Basis
As with the primary caregiver approach, however, our principal concerns with a
legislative presumption of shared custody are substantive. On welfare grounds,
although a joint custody rule may represent some improvement upon a regime of sole
custody, the evidence to this effect is nowhere certain. In any event, by contemplating
court-ordered shared custody as a general principle, the very essence of the rule
contradicts the child protection rationale for making the best interests of the child the
paramount consideration in every custody dispute. Ifparental inability to agree upon
specific aspects of the legal or physical custody of the child does not itself pose
substantial risks to the psychological well-being of the child, custody disputes should
be resolved according to principles of private dispute-settlement rather than child
protection.
From the perspective of justice, however, a statutory preference for shared custody
is considerably worse than a rule favouring sole custody to the child's primary
caregiver. While the latter fails to adequately account for the contextual and relational
character of concrete custody disputes, the former disregards considerations of
context and relations altogether.
Welfare Considerations As with the procedural basis for a presumption of joint
383. Bill 95, s. 1(1) [proposed CLRA, s. 20(la)]. The Bill would also require the court to "state in its
reasons for judgment the findings of fact upon which it has determined that the presumption is
rebutted." Ibid. s. 3 [proposed CLRA, s. 28(2)].
384. Ibid. s. 2 [proposed CLRA, s. 24(2)].
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custody, little need be said here about the welfare rationale for the substantive
outcome of shared custody, since these reasons have been. surveyed already in
responding to the sole custody principle embodied in the primary caregiver approach:
A considerable body of research suggests that children benefit from continued
relationships with both parents following separation or divorce. Consequently, as one
commentator has written, joint custody "may provide the most effective method of
implementing the states' paramount public policy interest - the protection of the best
interests of the children of divorced [or separated] parents. ,,385
On the other hand, critics and skeptics ofcourt-orderedjoint custody have recorded
numerous reservations concerning the optimistic picture portrayed by its advocates.
First, feminists have questioned the extent to which formal joint custody orders will
ensure meaningful shared parenting following separation. Instead, it is argued,
"joint" custody is more likely to involve primary parenting by mothers with equal
decision-making by fathers. 386 While this result is mainly criticized as unjust, inas-
much as it does not relieve primary caregivers of the tangible burdens of de facto
single parenthood but instead imposes upon them the additional hindrance of joint
decision-making, the additional pressure of such an arrangement may have adverse
consequences for the welfare of the child. What is more, where courts decrease child
support obligations on the assumption that formal joint custody means actual shared
fmancial obligations, a presumption of shared custody may undermine children's
economic interests, as well as their emotional interests. 387
More generally, critics have questioned the alleged benefits to the child of both
joint physical custody and joint legal custody. With respect to the former, research
has disclosed some evidence of emotional disruption due to frequent residential
changes.P'" So too, actuarial analysis has documented the added fmancial burden of
maintaining two "primary residences" for the child. 389 While several empirical
studies of joint physical custody arrangements report "few problems of adjustment
and high degrees of satisfaction.v-?" these involve primarily middle class families
with adequate resources to manage dual living arrangements.391 With respect to joint
legal custody, although several authors have noted a marked decline in parental
hostility during the first year after separation.V" an ability ofmost parents to separate
385. Robinson, supra, note 382 at 32-33.
386. See, e.g., Holmes, supra, note 308 at 312-18; and Fineman, supra, note 305 at 759.
387. See, e.g., Renee Joyal-Poupart, "Joint Custody," in Elizabeth Sloss, ed., Family Law in Canada:
New Directions, (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1985) at
117-18. On the other hand, recent empirical investigation suggests that this phenomenon has not
resulted in economic hardship to mothers and children in joint custody arrangements, but
instead reflects "the more equitable and substantial income statuses of divorcing parents who opted
for [joint] custody." Pearson and Thoennes, supra, note 347 at 335.
388. See, e.g., Alice Abarbanel, "Shared Parenting After Separation and Divorce: A Study of Joint
Custody" (1979), 49 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 320 at 328; Susan Steinman, "The Experience of
Children in a Joint-Custody Arrangement: A Report of a Study" (1981), 51 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry
403 at 412-13.
389. Melissa Patterson, "The Added Costs of Shared Lives," in Folberg, supra, note 33 at 72.
390. Ryan, supra, note 324 at 134.
391. Schwartz, supra, note 53 at 237.





their own inter-personal conflict from their roles as joint custodial parents,393 and
positive benefits to children from continued contact with two psychologicalparents,394
the research upon which these enthusiastic assessments are based involves over-
whelmingly voluntary joint custody arrangements established extra-judicially and
without professional assistance.395 In contrast, in three of the four court-orderedjoint
custody arrangements examined by Susan Steinman, the parents remained "intensely
hostile" and the children were "having significant emotional and behavioral
problems."396 On the other hand, notes Steinman, these disturbing results relate more
to the degree of parental conflict involved (physical violence or verbal abuse) and to
the psychological state of the individual parents, than to the fact of court-ordered joint
custody itself. 397
While these more skeptical evaluations raise serious doubts as to the welfare
justification for a legal presumption of joint custody, it is far from clear that sole
custody represents a preferable alternative. On the contrary, as already explained,
such a result entails its own disadvantages in the form of diminished contact between
the child and the non-custodial parent, increased dependency by the child on the
custodial parent, and a greater likelihood of parental antagonism and relitigation. In
fact, as more than one commentator has pointed out, since sole custody orders
typically include provisions for access by the non-custodial parent, children in a sole
custody arrangement may experience the same emotional trauma from parental
conflict as those subject to a court order for joint (legal and/or physical) custody. 398
Furthermore, to the extent that joint custody (and family mediation) may encourage
parental cooperation, such conflict might be less frequent in a joint custody regime
than in a jurisdiction favouring sole custody. On balance, therefore, a joint custody
presumption may further the best interests of more children than a rule favouring sole
custody to the primary caregiver.
In reaching this extremely tentative conclusion, however, we by no means endorse
contemporary legislative presumptions favouring joint custody in the best interests of
the child. On the contrary, as we have already explained, by admitting the possibility
(indeed the likelihood) of court-ordered joint custody, such a rule challenges the child
protection rationale upon which the.welfare principle itself is based. Consequently, if
joint custody is to be coherently rationalized as a substantive outcome to actual
custody disputes, this must be accomplished according to the justice-based grounds
of intra-familial dispute-settlement rather than the welfare-oriented criteria of child
protection.
393. See, e.g., Constance Ahrons, "The Continuing Coparental Relationship Between Divorced
Spouses" (1981), 51 Am. J. Orthopsych. 415.
394. See, e.g., Abarbanel, supra, note 388; and Steinman, supra, note 388.
395. Susan Steinman, "Joint Custody: What We Know, What We Have Yet to Learn, and the Judicial
and Legislative Implications" (1983) 16 V.C. Davis L. Rev. 739 at 743. See also Chambers,
supra, note 53 at 553.
396. Steinman, ibid. at 752.
397. Ibid. As already stated, child abuse and spousal assult constitute important and independent bases
for the termination of parental rights. Supra, note 365.
398. See, e.g., Chambers, supra, note 53 at 557; Robinson, supra, note 382 at 33.
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While this approach may be appropriate for the division of family property upon
spousal separation.t!' it cannot be blithely transposed to the law of custody. First, by
treating children as objects to be equally shared upon parental separation, it ignores
their independent interests in residential and relational continuity, as well as their
developing capacity for independent choice. Second, by abstracting from the unique
context of the actual custody dispute, it forswears the relational analysis that is
essential to a thorough explication of justice in the individual case.
Thus, for example, where a traditional father has had little direct involvement with
the child, who has been cared for primarily by the mother, a flexible application of the.
primary caregiver approach has considerably greater appeal than a rigid rule of shared
custody. To require the child suddenly to spend equal time with each parent would be
to establish a pattern of family life completely at odds with that existing prior to
parental separation. Dividing the child "equally" between both parents, such a rule
ignores the distinctive character of each parent's relationship with the child, upon
which a more contextual notion of family justice depends. According to the latter
relational approach, attention to the intensity of the primary caregiver bond requires
differential treatment involving primary residence with the mother. 412
So too, an equal division of "rights and responsibilities" with respect to decisions
about the child's upbringing might be unjust in the context of a given dispute. Thus,
for example, where the child's religion has been a special concern and exclusive
responsibility of one parent alone,413 to grant the other a formally equal voice in this
area following separation may be inappropriate.f!" In any event, absent a specific
the contracting parents. Thus, the Ontario Bill contemplates a "parenting agreement" by which
the parents are to determine: "(a) the period or periods that the child shall reside with each parent;
(b) the method by which parents are to reach agreement concerning major decisions about the
child's physical, mental, moral and emotional well-being; (c) the method of resolving a disagree-
ment between the parents concerning the child's best interests or the interpretation of the
agreement; and (d) the periodic review and renogotiation of the terms of the agreement by the
parents." Bill 95, s. 4 [proposed CLRA, s. 29a(2)]. While such an exercise may represent a
useful method of helping the family to decide upon post-separation custody arrangements, we have
considerable reservations both with the process of private ordering by which this agreement is
reached (in which mothers and children are almost always disadvantaged relative to fathers) and
with the potential for the contractual paradigm to impose a rigid and unalterable structure upon
family relationships. For a persuasive critique of private ordering in this context, see Martha
Shaffer, "Divorce Mediation: A Feminist Perspective" (1988), 46 D.T. Fac. L. Rev. 162. For a
particularly disturbing example of contractual inflexibility, see Elster, supra, note 248 at 45 (pro-
posing that "marrying couples [be given] the option of binding themselves to one custody
procedure or another in case they later decide to divorce and find themselves unable to agree on
custody").
411. See, e.g., FLA, Part 1.
412. On the other hand, where separation stimulates the father to pursue more meaningful relationships
with his children, the law should provide flexibility to allow this relational flourishing. Thus, as
suggested earlier, the father's wishes should be reasonably accommodated by the mother and the -
child, taking into account the reasons for his sudden interest, the burdens that this accommoda-
tion will impose on the mother and the child, and the wishes of the child. Supra, note 363.
413. On our use of the word "responsibility," see supra, note 362.
414. We emphasize the conditional "may" in this sentence to indicate the need for further investigation
to consider the context in which the child's religion was originally decided. Thus, for example,
where the father's religion prevailed over that of the mother on account of a general pattern of
unequal (gender-based) decision-making, to grant the father ultimate authority in religious
matters would be to ratify the inequality of the original decision.
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dispute over a particular aspect of the child's upbringing (which could be properly
resolved only in light of the context in which it itself were to arise), there is simply no
need to make a formal order respecting the "legal" custody of the child.
Consequently, an equal division of decision-making authority is both acontextual and
unnecessary.
Conclusion
The contemporary law of child custody is both misconceived and self-contradictory.
By emphasizing child protection as the primary purpose of the custody decision, it
embodies a traditional conception of the family as a natural (non-legal) domain and
thus undermines the autonomy of individual families to determine for themselves the
form of their own collective life. Moreover, in failing to apply the same child
protection standards to "intact" families, the best interests test implies that separation
and divorce are pathological, and that "intact" nuclear families are themselves the
only legitimate family form. As a result, the law repeatedly allows for the imposition
on individual families of prevailing societal norms, scientific theories and judicial
assumptions regarding family life and childhood needs.
Furthermore, while custody law declares that custody decisions are to be
determined solely according to the best interests of the child, the current regime does
not secure the welfare of children as a whole. In fact, by ensuring costly and invasive
adjudicative proceedings and by encouraging strategic behaviour on the part of
separating parents, the prevailing standards are detrimental to children's interests. As
a result the present system fails even on its own terms.
Regardless, it is in its structural emphasis on child protection that our objection to
the current regime is greatest. While child protection remains an important
consideration in resolving issues of child custody, it cannot be the paramount or sole
concern. Recognition of the multiplicity of family forms and acceptance of the role of
law in the settlement of family disputes demands that custody law give priority to the
function of family dispute resolution rather than that of child protection. Moreover,
the unique character of the family requires a distinctive approach to this function of
dispute resolution. Rather than formulating a set of abstract principles to determine
the outcome of family disputes, this adjudicative approach would follow the context
of existing family relationships and draw its normative stance from that context.
The two leading proposals for substantive custody reform - the primary caregiver
presumption and joint custody - fail to realize this vision of family justice. First,
while each may achieve some improvements over the ability of the current standard to
advance the welfare of children as a whole, to the extent that they are conceived as
presumptions for determining the child's best interests, they remain tied to a notion of
custody law in which the protection of the child is primary. Second, to the extent that
both embody a conception of justice, in each case, these visions are incomplete. Joint
custody adopts a rigid and acontextual approach to family justice, disregarding real
relationships within actual families.' Similarly, while the primary caregiver approach
at least attends to the context of individual families, it fails to adequately account for
the rich diversity of relationships within these families.
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Developments in family law over the last twenty years have exposed the inherent
indeterminacy of the best interests test and have rendered contemporary custody law
fundamentally anachronistic. Principles of gender equality and family autonomy
have undermined the traditional presumptions that once lent certainty to the best
interests test. So too, family autonomy contradicts the child protection rationale for
the custody decision. No longer are separation and divorce associated with notions of
fault and deviance. No longer can the family be identified with the monolithic vision
of the "intact" nuclear family. Custody law must now be made to conform to the new
pluralistic conception of the family.
Consequently, instead of enacting guidelines or presumptions regarding the best
interests of the child, legislative reform must begin by abolishing the best interests
test. Instead, the primary emphasis of custody law must be redirected toward the task
of family dispute resolution. Substantively, this demands a relational and contextual
approach rather than the rigid notion of individual rights reflected in current joint
custody proposals. Procedurally, this requires institutional reforms designed to
facilitate cooperative solutions to custody disputes without abandoning family
members to the vagaries of private mediation.v'i' While these more comprehensive
tasks of reconceiving custody law have only just begun,416they are essential ifwe are
to resolve custody disputes with care and with justice.
415. Shaffer, supra, note 410.
416. See, e.g., Abella, supra, note 134; Judith Ryan, "The Mediation of Family Law Disputes: Implica-
tions for Legal Practice and Ethics," Unpublished LL.M. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1986.
